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ABSTRACT 	  Information	  security	  professionals	  have	  a	  unique	  challenge	  in	  today’s	  connected	  world.	  	  They	  are	  charged	  with	  protecting	  digital	  assets	  from	  individuals,	  groups,	  and	  even	  foreign	  governments	  with	  little	  or	  no	  restrictions	  limiting	  their	  behavior.	  	  To	  be	  successful,	  security	  experts	  must	  have	  the	  mindset	  and	  skills	  of	  those	  who	  seek	  to	  harm	  their	  organization,	  but	  most	  are	  not	  allowed	  to	  retaliate,	  in	  kind.	  	  Instead,	  they	  must	  use	  these	  skills	  only	  to	  predict	  and	  to	  prevent	  future	  attacks;	  thus	  using	  their	  technical	  prowess	  for	  good	  and	  not	  for	  evil.	  	  In	  a	  survey	  of	  330	  information	  security	  professionals,	  the	  data	  reveals	  six	  mindsets	  of	  security	  experts	  through	  a	  latent	  class	  analysis.	  	  One	  class	  emerged	  containing	  approximately	  52%	  of	  the	  respondents,	  which	  indicates	  that	  the	  information	  security	  field	  is	  consistent	  with	  social	  identity	  theory	  and	  contains	  significant	  homogeneity	  in	  mindset	  toward	  securing	  an	  organization’s	  digital	  assets.	  	  Additionally,	  personality	  characteristics	  such	  as	  Creativity,	  Trait	  Competitiveness,	  and	  Morality	  influence	  membership	  in	  one	  of	  six	  information	  security	  mindsets.	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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent years, the popular media has reported data breaches leading to stolen credit 
cards numbers (Rodriquez, 2013), theft of login credentials from major social networks (Vijayan, 
2012), release of sensitive intelligence data by security analysts , and publication of classified 
movements of military personnel (Bumiller, 2010).  Without regard for privacy or national 
security, computer savvy hackers and paid contractors break into networks as well as access 
sensitive information within a secure network with the intent to use or to publicize the sensitive 
information (Mackey, 2013).  As self-appointed champions of full-disclosure in government, 
these infamous whistleblowers have, potentially, placed lives or national security in danger.  
Certainly, they have succeeded in bringing to light sensitive information of which they 
determined the public, through the national media, should be informed.  In light of the much 
publicized events of hackers and security analysts absconding with financial data and national 
secrets, recent research has attempted to identify characteristics of hackers in an attempt to 
suggest reasons for their behavior (Xu, Hu, & Zhang, 2013).  Xu, Hu, & Zhang (2013) proposed 
an integrative framework to explain the factors influencing young computer users to become 
hackers.  Drawing on the criminal justice literature, their qualitative research shows the influence 
of Social Learning Theory, Routine Activity Theory and Situational Action Theory on young 
computer programmers turning to hacking.  With so many young, intelligent computer 
enthusiasts looking for acceptance and challenge, it becomes even more important to identify 
equally intelligent and motivated computer experts of all ages to work for government and 
industry to secure national and corporate data. Although informative, Xu et al. (2013) focus on 
  2 
the social learning perspective in their study.  Social identity is equally relevant to how computer 
enthusiasts become hackers, and this study suggests that it, also, influences how security 
professionals are chosen to protect an organization.  
Who better to occupy the ranks of information system security organizations than bright, 
curious computer enthusiasts who form their own in-groups and have spent much of their 
formative years experimenting with computers learning tricks and techniques designed to 
infiltrate computer networks.  It is these computer users that have the background and knowledge 
to detect intrusions and to protect the assets of an organization.  Although not all information 
systems security (ISS) professionals are former hackers, the purpose of this study is to classify 
types of security professionals and then to investigate their personality characteristics by 
showing how these personality characteristics influence membership in the specific classes.   
Once characteristics can be successfully identified, understanding how to motivate the young 
computer enthusiasts with an interest in hacking and redirecting their enthusiasm toward 
information security can begin. 
 This study draws on research into motivation for young computer enthusiasts and 
previous research into personality characteristics to determine a classification of security 
professionals.  Further, the classification will help organizations identify the types of individuals 
that are responsible for securing their government and corporate networks from new and 
experienced hackers intent on doing them harm.  The study, also, investigates the relationships 
between the classes of ISS professionals along with specific personality characteristics to 
determine whether the particular characteristics chosen for this study predict membership into a 
specific type of security professional.    
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1.1 Research Questions 
 
In this study, the types of ISS professionals that span the continuum from aggressive anti-
hacker to a passive IT security worker are explored.  The goal of this study is to begin to develop 
a classification of ISS professional whose intent is to detect, stop, and, potentially, retaliate when 
a breach of network security is detected compared with an ISS professional that simply monitors 
the installed software and reports suspicious activity to management.  The study suggests there 
are multiple conceptual groupings, or mindsets, of ISS professionals that span the entire 
continuum.  Interesting findings such as the types of ISS personnel that exist in organizations 
today, discovering the characteristics of these ISS professionals, and to which classes these 
characteristics are assigned, is the focus of this study.  The study seeks to answer two questions: 
1) What conceptual groups exist that distinctly categorize the types of ISS professionals 
that are prone to either avoid network security activity or to develop aggressive 
means to stop those intent on breaching them? 
2) Which characteristics predict membership into ISS Professional’s mindset classes? 
 
To address the first research question, the study uses latent class analysis, which 
identifies levels of a latent, categorical variable using observed categorical variables.  In this 
instance, the observed variables will lead to the types of information security professionals found 
in organizations.  After determining the classification of ISS professionals, the study investigates 
the influence of important personality characteristics on class membership.  Those personality 
characteristics are covered in the following sections. 
1.2 Creativity 
 
This study investigates creativity of the security professional from the perspective of his or 
her ability to think like the person attempting to intrude on the network.  To be an effective ISS 
professional, the influence of creativity on ISS classification was explored.  Much work has been 
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done in the area of creativity but very little work has been done to assess the influence of 
creativity on information security workers.  This study shows that the more creative the person 
is, the more effective he or she is in thinking like a person intent on breaching a network.   
Within the domain of information systems security, creativity manifests itself in numerous 
ways.  Hackers find ways to breach a network, such as social engineering techniques designed to 
acquire network credentials, brute force distributed denial of service attacks, and viruses that lie 
dormant for months or even years before activating and allowing access or damaging nodes on a 
network.  A “creative” ISS professional must develop numerous ways to communicate to 
members of an organization to help prepare employees for social engineering attempts, but he or 
she must, also, know how to detect intrusion through the use of intrusion detection software as 
well as through use of detection algorithms that are unique to an organization.  Therefore, the 
study draws information from the creativity literature related to domain specificity as much as 
from the traditional creativity literature to understand the influence of creativity on ISS 
classification.   In addition to creativity, ISS professionals must possess the ability to “out-think” 
a hacker by identifying a vulnerability before a hacker has an opportunity to exploit it.  After 
identifying the vulnerability, the ISS professional must mitigate the potential damage of the 
vulnerability before the hacker has an opportunity to access the network through the uncorrected 
vulnerability. 
1.3 Trait Competitiveness 
 
 Competitive individuals possess an intrinsic desire for interpersonal competition from 
which they receive enjoyment that drives the desire to compete against others, and to win 
(Spence & Helmreich, 1983).  This intrinsic competitiveness is referred to as a trait 
competitiveness (S. P. Brown, Cron, & Slocum, 1998).  Unlike situational competitiveness in 
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which a person competes only for the duration of the competition, trait competitiveness spans 
situations.  This study suggests that ISS professionals can be classified differently based on the 
measure of trait competitiveness.  Highly competitive ISS workers may be motivated to detect a 
breach in the network, identify where and how it was breached, determine a plan to mitigate the 
damage, develop a strategy for prevention of future intrusions, and even trace the intrusion back 
to its originator.  These competitive ISS workers are on one end of the spectrum, and on the other 
end is a passive security worker.  Passive workers can be valuable by monitoring the detection 
software, but their level of competitiveness does not motivate them to take an intrusion 
personally, like the highly competitive ISS professional.   Not only does the study suggest the 
influence of competitiveness on class membership, but differing degrees of deceptiveness predict 
membership, as well. 
1.4 Deceptiveness 
 
Deceptiveness involves actions that are not straightforward.  In fact, dictionary.com defines 
deceptiveness as misleading “by a false appearance or statement” (“the definition of deceive,” 
n.d.).  Infamous hacker, Kevin Mitnick, became, arguably, the most well-known hacker by 
simply using the art of deception, which was the title of his book (Mitnick & Simon, 2003).  
Although Mitnick claims to have used social engineering, primarily to break into networks, other 
hackers use other forms of deception to mask their identity.  To be able to stop a hacker from 
breaching a network, an effective information security person must possess some ability to think 
like a hacker – only sooner. To think like a hacker requires the ISS professional to possess 
similar deceptive ability as the person he or she is trying to stop.   
To be effective in ISS, one must anticipate possible intrusions and direct the potential attack 
vector to one in which the hacker can be detected and stopped.  In many ways, the ISS 
  6 
professional must be more deceptive, or at least think more deceptively, than those he or she is 
trying to stop, because not only must the potential vector be identified, but the ISS worker must 
be able to draw the attacker into a trap that the attacker does not detect.  This is a level of 
deceptiveness that requires careful thought and planning; otherwise, the ISS professional will be 
required to anticipate the uncaught hacker returning at a later time with additional information 
and, often, new resolve.  
 
1.5 Distrust 
 
 Trust is defined as “the expectancy of positive (or nonnegative) outcomes that one can 
receive based on the expected action of another  party in an interaction characterized by 
uncertainty” (Bhattacharya, Devinney, & Pillutla, 1998, p 462).  Bhattacharya et al. (1998) 
describe this definition as an imprecise verbal definition of trust.  However it is defined, security 
workers cannot afford to rely in the trustworthy behavior of others.  Certainly, they possess a 
level of trust in their colleagues and fellow employees of an organization, but much like the 
police personality, ISS professionals have the potential of developing a level of distrust in people 
both external to and within an organization they support (Twersky-Glasner, 2005).   
 Further, Bhattacharya et al. (1998) describe, using set theory, the necessary scenarios 
under which trust and distrust can be directly determined as a binary decision.  Over time, 
distrust of practically everyone develops in the mind of the ISS professional - at least everyone 
with the access to organizational digital assets or with the technical ability to attempt to gain 
access to them.  Thus, in this study, ISS professionals’ level of general distrust is of greater 
interest than his or her level of trust. 
 In contrast with trust, distrust occurs when there is an expectation of injurious action 
(Luhmann, 1979).  Distrust manifests itself when an “other” displays incompetence, acts 
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irresponsibly, violates obligations, or acts in a manner that is harmful to the person exhibiting 
distrust (Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 1998).  This study explores the impact of an ISS 
professional’s level of distrust as a predictor of a specific ISS classification. .  Finally, using all 
of these characteristics without a way to govern the behavior, the ISS professional may be as 
dangerous as the hacker; however, one characteristic is important to keep the ISS professional 
from “crossing the line” into the world of hacking.   
1.6 Morality 
 Defining morality is a challenge with a multitude of “what-if” exceptions.  It cannot 
simply be defined in terms of moral versus immoral, nor can morality be defined as the opposite 
of non-moral.  Immorality and non-moral are two completely different ideas (Frankena, 1988). 
This study views morality in the simple context of private ownership of property and 
information.  An organization owns the digital assets that it has accumulated in the normal 
course of its business and has acquired by legal means.  This study is not intended to evaluate 
specific instances of data an organization or government has acquired in the determination of 
morality.  In this study, the assets of an organization are assumed to belong to an organization 
and any access to the information by unauthorized persons is considered a violation of the legal 
right of ownership granted to the organization.  Therefore, any attempted access to the 
information is considered a violation of an organization’s right to protect it.   
 Thus, unauthorized attempts to access information are considered an immoral act.  
Although this is a very narrow definition of morality, it is somewhat universally accepted that 
organizations are well within their rights to protect assets of which they consider themselves the 
owners. 
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1.7 Latent Class Analysis 
 
 Latent class analysis (LCA) is a method of determining latent variables from categorical 
observed variables.  A technique similar to factor analysis, LCA, however, produces a 
categorical construct, calculated without error.  Factor analysis, on the other hand, produces a 
continuous factor from continuous observed variables (Collins & Lanza, 2010).    The primary 
difference between the two approaches is that, where factor analysis identifies a latent 
continuous variable, LCA, on the other hand, produces a categorical latent variable whose 
distribution is multinomial.  This study focuses on people who differ quantitatively along the 
continuum of types of information systems security professionals.   
 Latent class analysis has been used in many studies in the social and behavioral sciences 
to distinguish among characteristics of people (Mäkikangas, Hyvönen, Leskinen, Kinnunen, & 
Feldt, 2011; Morin, Morizot, Boudrias, & Madore, 2011; Qureshi & Fang, 2010).  As described 
in the previous definition and brief description, it is useful to classify types of an entity using 
categorical observed variables and producing a categorical latent variable as a result.  Woo & 
Allen (2013) used LCA to create a classification of stayers and seekers in an organization.  
Organizational research is rich with opportunity to use LCA to identify classifications of 
individuals at work (Wang & Hanges, 2010).  Wang & Hanges (2010) point out the advantages 
of using latent class analysis as a clustering approach over traditional cluster analysis.  One 
primary reason is that LCA produces a maximum likelihood (log-likelihood) estimate of the 
model parameters, similar to structural equation modeling, which uses statistically consistent 
criteria for allocating observations into latent classifications.  A primary objective of this study is 
to identify classifications of ISS professionals, which makes LCA an attractive technique.  
Further, LCA is not restricted to normal distribution of the observed variables, which provides 
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flexibility in developing items used in the LCA.  The estimate produced from a latent class 
analysis is a probabilistic classification, thus providing the probability of membership in each 
class determined.  This allows the latent class model to be used with other observations within 
the population from which the model is developed to predict membership in the classes (Wang & 
Hanges, 2010). 
 LCA requires questions with categorical responses as input.  To produce scientifically 
valid questions for use in the LCA, the study relies upon the Delphi technique to query a group 
of experts in information security to provide the questions.  Therefore, this study presents the 
Delphi-Driven Latent Class Analysis Method as an approach to the analysis.  It is not a statistical 
approach; rather, it is a set of steps, similar to a systems development methodology, to follow 
when conducting research similar to that used in this study.  The nature of Delphi is such that 
when limited prior research is available in a subject area, the technique can be used to extract 
reliable information from a group of experts.  The questions resulting from the Delphi study step 
are used to develop the questions asked in the LCA.  In the situation where further analysis is 
desired to determine other factors influencing class membership, the remaining steps can be 
performed to assess the factors’ influence on membership in one or more of the classes found in 
the LCA.   
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Figure 1 - The Delphi-Driven Latent Class Analysis Method 
 
1.8 Next Steps 
 
 Chapter 2 contains a literature review of the theoretical foundation of the constructs 
under investigation and the methodological techniques employed in this study.  Chapter 3 
presents the methods used in gathering and analyzing the data upon which this study is based, 
while chapter 4 presents the study findings of the Delphi, the pilot, and the primary study.  
Chapter 5 discusses the findings, the of the study’s impact on theory and management, and 
suggested future research, and chapter 6 contains concluding remarks on the study as a whole.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Research Model 
 
 Predicting the effectiveness of ISS professionals, as with any professional, is a 
combination of numerous constructs; however, there are constructs that are critical in 
determining the effectiveness of information security workers.  They have many of the same 
skills common to application developers, system administrators, and other information 
technology workers; however, to be an effective ISS professional, this study investigates 
characteristics that, although possessed by all professionals in information technology, are 
particularly applicable to workers in ISS. 
 This study looks at the effect of trait competitiveness, distrust, creativity, deceptiveness 
and morality on membership in a specific class of information technology professional.  The 
questions to ask, which are used to determine class memberships are developed through both a 
Delphi study to glean information from a group of information security experts and from the 
literature.  In the study, it was initially planned to use Delphi solely to provide the questions, but 
the Delphi group focused almost exclusively on job interview questions and many of the 
responses from the panel were more general in nature, which did not allow for differentiation 
based on type of ISS professional.  Thus, the Delphi questions are supplemented by ETSI’s 
Information Security Incidents Taxonomy (Rennoch & Gaudin, 2013). 
 Information Systems Security type is the dependent variable of the study, and the design 
of the questions related to determining the type of ISS professional produced a binary or a 
ternary response.  In other words, the responses to the questions, and thus the variables, were 
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categorical.  Further, given the nature of classifications, the construct representing the type of 
ISS professional was a categorical variable, as well.  This lends itself to the use of latent class 
analysis (LCA).  LCA is described in more detail in a subsequent section of the literature review, 
but, in short, LCA is similar to factor analysis.  However, where factor analysis uses continuous 
observed variables to determine continuous latent factors, LCA uses categorical observed 
variables to determine categorical latent variables.   
 After the types of ISS professionals are determined, the study investigates the influence 
that specific characteristics have on class membership in one of several classes.  The 
characteristics of interest in this study are creativity, trait competitiveness, deceptiveness, 
distrust, and morality.  These constructs are determined from the literature and are influential in 
the type of work performed by ISS professionals.  Once all of the constructs are related, the 
following research model emerges: 
 
 
Figure 2 – Research Model 
 
Trait 
Competitiveness
Deceptiveness
Distrust
Information 
Systems Security 
Classification
Creativity
Morality
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 In this research, a Delphi study is performed and the resulting questions that are 
determined by experts are combined with questions based on the ISS literature to be used to 
determine the classification of ISS professionals.  Finally, multinomial logistic regression is 
performed to determine the influence, on class membership, of each personality characteristic in 
Figure 2. 
 In the following sections, each technique and construct is described as determined from 
the literature.  First, the Delphi technique is described, followed by the remaining 
methodological techniques.  The constructs representing each personality characteristic are 
described from the relevant literature.  As each construct is described, hypotheses are presented 
showing the expected findings of the theoretical relationships. 
2.2 Delphi 
 
 The Delphi technique is a methodology that is useful when research describing the area 
of interest is limited and constructs are not identified are or unclear (Cegielski, 2008; Okoli & 
Pawlowski, 2004).  Developed in the 1950’s at the RAND Corporation, the Delphi technique is 
designed to elicit and refine group judgments (Dalkey, 1969).  The primary objective is to obtain 
reliable consensus on a topic from a group of experts (Dalkey & Helmer, 1963).   
 The methodology has three features that make it useful when seeking to discover 
information for which there is not a definitive source of authority.  In the context of factors 
leading decision-makers to choose the use of virtual staffing firms over traditional methods, for 
instance, there have been studies looking at this issue; however, there are no sources of definitive 
authority (Kim, 2010; Lin, Viswanathan, & Agarwal, 2010).  Therefore, the Delphi method is an 
adequate tool to elicit this information.  The advantage this technique has over group interviews 
are: (1) anonymous response, (2) iteration and controlled feedback, and (3) statistical group 
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response.  These advantages are important to group settings.  The first advantage, anonymous 
response, is important to avoid the problems created when a single, prominent person dominates 
the conversation in a group setting.  In certain settings, this can be the ranking member involved 
in the meeting.  In other settings, it can simply be the person with the strongest personality or 
opinion.  Anonymous responses in the Delphi technique, through the use of questionnaires, avoid 
the problems of respondent dominance in a group setting.  Semantic noise can become a problem 
in a group setting where anonymity is absent, also.  Semantic noise suggests the inevitability of 
group discussions losing focus of the purpose of the meeting.  Semantic noise may appear 
focused on the problem, but often it is irrelevant or creates bias on the responses of the group as 
a whole (Dalkey, 1969).  Finally, in face-to-face group communication, pressure to conform to 
the opinion of the group or of a dominant individual can influence the consensus of opinion. 
Table 1 – Characteristics of the Delphi Method 
(Cegielski, 2008, p. 35) 
Characteristics  Description 
Anonymity  The administrator manages communication to and from all  
participants, which provides anonymity for all participants 
Controlled Feedback  The administrator manages the flow of information to and from the 
participants 
Group Response  Individual responses are gathered by the administrator and distributed 
back to the participants as a group response 
Expert Opinion  Participants are selected for inclusion in the study based on knowledge 
of the topic 
Reduced Time/Cost  Face-to-face meetings with a, potentially, widely distributed audience are rarely necessary 
 
 The technique begins by asking experts open-ended questions related to the topic of the 
study.  The number of questions asked is flexible, but should be concise.  The purpose of the 
original questions is to elicit responses from the respondents in a manner much like a 
brainstorming session produces.  The respondent answers each of the questions, which are asked 
in a free-form manner.  The researcher then reviews the responses and, optimally, by at least two 
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additional coders, who review the free-form responses and develop a list of the responses to each 
question.   
 The researchers produce a second round of questionnaires with a list of the responses to 
each question.  The respondents are asked to rank the responses from most appropriate to least 
appropriate response to the questions (from 1 to the number of items to rank).  Upon receipt of 
the responses, the researcher calculates the ranking of the items for each question by calculating 
the average ranking for each item and ordering these responses in rank order.  In the third round, 
questionnaires are sent to the respondent with the group rankings included.  The respondents are 
asked to rank the items again or to confirm the existing rankings, given the order calculated by 
averaging the rankings from the previous round.  This gives respondents an opportunity to 
reconsider their initial ranking.  This process is repeated until group consensus is reached.   
2.4 Social Identity Theory 
 
 People have a natural tendency to classify others and themselves into categories.  
Particularly within I.T., members of specific factions of the organization view their function and 
role in the organization as more important or as contributing more to the goals of the 
organization.  This social identification is not unique to I.T.; rather it is common across human 
interaction and behavior (Brown, 2000).   
 This identification with others in similar roles in the organization is known as social 
identification, which is defined as “the perception of oneness with or belongingness to some 
human aggregate” (Ashforth & Mael, 1989).  Within all aspects of an organization, and 
particularly within an I.T. organization, individuals identify with the goals of the group and 
project those group goals onto themselves as individual goals.  Additionally, an individual may 
project his or her goals onto the group and thus perceive not only the group’s goals as her own 
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but may view the congruence of individual and group goals without ability to distinguish 
between them.   
 Xu, Hu,  and Zhang (2013) identified this behavior in their study investigating why 
young computer enthusiasts become hackers.  Although they, likely, misconstrue the behavior as 
exclusively social learning, the behavior Xu et al. (2013) describes includes social learning and a 
social identification that contributes to hackers identification with like-minded enthusiasts.  
Much like the close-knit community of security professionals, hackers relate to and associate 
with other hackers (Xu et al., 2013).  Many security professionals develop an interest in 
computers at a young age, like hackers do, and some have even actively hacked systems early in 
their association with computers (Kabay, 2008).  Often, these young hackers experiment with 
increasingly deviant behavior, as defined by the majority of early computer enthusiasts, and 
many continue into less playful experimentation with hacking into an active “career” in hacking 
government or corporate computer systems (Xu et al., 2013).  This identity with the hacking in-
group may shape their behavior, leading some to continue into more questionable, and 
sometimes criminal behavior, while others adapt these skills for the sake of earning an income 
and become security professionals (Caldwell, 2011).  This is not the usual path for a security 
worker, however. 
 Role conflict can become an issue for an I.T. person that has experience with, or certainly 
the intellectual capability to participate in hacking.  Especially for those who move into the role 
of security professional (Ashforth & Mael, 1989).  The majority of security professionals have, 
likely, never hacked into a computer system, but it is this close association between accessing a 
computer system without authorization and being charged with the responsibility of stopping 
those who want to access a system or network that underpins the characteristics assessed in this 
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study.  It is not the assertion of this researcher nor the purpose of the study to suggest that all 
security professionals are former hackers or exhibit the tendency to hack networks.  Rather, a 
primary reason the personality characteristics tested in this study were chosen was to suggest that 
to stop a hacker, a security professional must think like one. 
2.3 Latent Class Analysis 
 
 Paul Lazarsfeld (1959) described the technique called latent structure analysis, which is 
now known as latent class analysis (LCA) (Henry, 1981).  Lazarsfeld described the technique as 
the use of classical mathematical models in the study of attitudes, and it was developed for 
certain behavioral science studies to analyze discrete-valued data, which were assumed to be 
indicators of an underlying, latent construct.  Often, a problem in sociological survey data is the 
necessity of gathering data for variables that are best designed to return ordinal or nominal 
values, instead of continuous variables.  Factor analysis can be used to determine latent variables 
from variables represented by continuous data, but categorical data is often the best 
representation of an observed variable.  Using LCA, latent classification variables measured as 
categorical data can be analyzed, much like factor analysis, to determine classes, thus, the 
development of latent class analysis.  The technique was designed, specifically, for sociological 
survey analysis, as opposed to factor analysis, which was used to analyze continuous variables.   
 LCA’s fundamental assumption is that the responses to each item are independent from 
selections made in other items, which describes local independence.  The variables used in LCA 
are measured as either ordinal or nominal, and the objective in LCA is to define a latent variable 
within which the “manifest variables are locally independent” (McCutcheon, 1987, p. 17).   
 The goal of LCA is to determine discrete classes, which are mutually exclusive (have 
good class separation, entropy); in other words, a member of a class exists in one, and only one 
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class.  Traditional LCA estimates both class membership probabilities and item-response 
probabilities (Lanza, Collins, Lemmon, & Schafer, 2007).  LCA offers the advantage of not 
making any assumptions about how the data is distributed.  Relative to factor analysis, which is a 
variable-oriented approach, LCA is a person-oriented approach (Collins & Lanza, 2010).  In 
LCA, the person as a whole is the focus of the approach, which allows the study of individual 
characteristics related to the problem being studied (Bergman & Magnusson, 1997).  LCA is 
appropriate when dichotomous or polytomous observed variables are available for use as input to 
the LCA.  These categorical variables are used in the LCA to derive a latent categorical variable 
using the item-response probabilities of the observed variables.  Similar to cluster analysis, LCA 
can be used to find clusters (or classes) of respondents to the observed variables, which, when 
analyzed by the investigator, result in distinct classifications.   
 Latent class analysis has been used in numerous studies to determine classifications of 
the respondents to the measures used.  For example, Woo & Allen (2013) used LCA to 
investigate organizational employees intentions to leave a job and classified various type of 
seeking and staying behavior of employees.  Other studies have been performed using LCA in 
psychology to assess depression (Mäkikangas et al., 2011), workplace affective commitment 
(Morin et al., 2011), and socialization process of open source software (Qureshi & Fang, 2010).   
 In the current study, LCA was used to determine the classification of the types of ISS 
professional.  In practice, the study suggests that ISS professionals can be classified by a specific 
focus on one aspect of security over another.  Further, the study posits that security workers 
range from aggressive to passive in terms of an individual’s perception of a denial of service 
attack, for instance.  In this scenario, one type of ISS professional monitors the output of 
particular security software systems and ensure that corrective action is taken to modify the 
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firewall when the monitoring software sends an attack alert.  On the other extreme, a different 
type of security expert may frequently review the web server settings to determine ways to fine-
tune the server to more quickly determine an attack is in-progress, while another type of ISS 
professional may develop a DoS program to run against a test server to validate and subsequently 
tweak settings to be modified before an attack is ever initiated against their organization.  These 
different approaches are some of the many ways ISS professionals can be classified.  This leads 
to the following hypothesis: 
H1: Information Systems Security professionals can be categorized into 
classes ranging from passively-oriented (reactive) to aggressively oriented 
(proactive) mindsets toward information systems security. 
 
 Whether passive versus aggressive is the name given to two of the classes, the intent of 
this hypothesis is to suggest that ISS professionals range from a more proactive approach to 
protecting digital assets to a more reactive stance. 
 Social identity theory, as discussed earlier, suggests that groups of people with similar 
characteristics tend to form homogenous groups, called in-groups.  These groups seek people 
with similar characteristics and seek to consider others that do not possess these characteristics to 
be members of out-groups (Ashforth & Mael, 1989).  Information security workers have a 
unique set of characteristics, even inside of I.T.  They are directed to perform one of the most 
challenging jobs in an organization, which is to protect its digital assets.  Performing this role can 
be taken very seriously and those who do it look for others that view security in much the same 
manner as they.  One of the most influential tenets of in-group behavior is the tendency for a 
group member to view the successes and failures of the group as his or her own, which further 
drives the desire for association with like-minded security professionals.  As part of their in-
group, security experts see their roles as superior to other roles in the I.T. department, and in 
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many ways, they are, because a breakdown in security can have far-reaching, public impact, 
unlike a bug in a report program used by a middle manager (R. Brown, 2000).  Because of the 
critical nature of the role played by ISS professionals, homogeneity of thought is very important, 
and the tendency to surround themselves with like-minded thinkers, likely, influences many 
security department staffing decisions.  Therefore,  
H2: One class of the types of will be significantly larger than other types 
2.4 Creativity 
 
 Creative ISS professionals, this study suggests, are expected to possess the talent to 
anticipate the behavior of those intent to harm the security worker’s organization from within or 
without.  Creativity is necessary but not sufficient to anticipate security threats; however, without 
the ability to think like a hacker or like an internal employee who attempts to steal organizational 
secrets, the ISS professional will be not be considered a talented, aggressive information security 
expert.  Creativity research has been conducted in various disciplines for decades.  In fact, Baer 
(1998) reports that domain specificity of creativity, not generality of creativity is the relevant 
way to approach creative- and divergent-thinking (Baer, 1998).  However, there is evidence that 
divergent thinkers exhibit creativity in cognitive process in various domains (Clapham, 2001; 
Guilford, 1959; Kim, 2006; 2008; Vincent, Decker, & Mumford, 2002), which has led to 
numerous scales used to measure creativity.  Kim (2006) performed a review of the use of the 
TTCT and found that it is important, in Torrence’s legacy, to enhance creativity among students.  
Measuring creativity is a challenging activity, compared to the use of creativity tests such as the 
TTCT in educational settings where the subject of the test is available and, given that it is most 
often used to test children for entry into gifted and talented programs, most parents readily agree 
to its use.  In an adult setting, however, even an abbreviated version is, often, prohibitive.  
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 This study suggests the necessity of aggressive information security professionals’ high 
level of creativity enable them to anticipate hacking attempts, for instance, and to develop 
creative investigation and prevention techniques.  Without high creativity, an ISS professional is 
reliant on the capabilities of the software installed for the organization and the alerts generated.  
This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H3: Creativity is related to class membership. 
 
2.5 Trait Competitiveness 
 
 Competitiveness involves the characteristic in a person in which he or she enjoys the 
desire to participate with the desire to win and to be better than others (Spence & Helmreich, 
1983).  This characteristic can manifest itself as a state in which a person is competitive in a 
particular situation but does not possess the competitive characteristic in other scenarios.  Thus, 
from this perspective, competitiveness is situational rather than a trait of the individual’s 
personality.  However, even in situations in which people work independently, trait 
competitiveness is likely to set their expected level of performance higher to allow them to 
achieve favorable perception from their peers and lead to positive performance evaluations (S. P. 
Brown et al., 1998). 
 Competitiveness has been investigated at varying levels of analysis.  For instance, 
competitiveness of the individual has been compared to the competitive climate of an 
organization using a person-environment framework to find that at the work group level, the 
competitive environment influenced the competitiveness of the individual (Fletcher, Major, & 
Davis, 2008).  This indicates that in an environment where competition is encouraged, trait 
competiveness of the individual ISS professionals is, likely, higher, which suggests that in an 
environment such as an information security team where the constant threat of being out-
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maneuvered by an intelligent foe is ever-present, the members of the organization, and certainly 
the top members of the information security team, will exhibit competitiveness for types of 
workers considered to be the top performers and the most aggressive.  Further, in measures of 
interpersonal success, competitiveness has been shown to be a contributing factor to that success 
(Houston, Mcintire, Kinnie, & Terry, 2002).  Houston et al. (2002) found that items of several 
popular competitiveness scales loaded on two factors: self-aggrandizement and interpersonal 
success.  The scale used in this study is consistent with the self-aggrandizement factor, indicating 
that the definition presented in this study measures the competitive nature of the individual’s 
desire to be noticed for their abilities to prevent “disaster” when faced with the seemingly 
insurmountable challenge of stopping threats from both inside and outside the organization.  In 
short, whether the ISS professional competes with individuals or collectives whose goal is to 
defeat the security team for personal glory or for a sense of satisfaction due to successfully 
fending off a foe, the core behavior is competition, regardless of the underlying motivation.  This 
competitiveness that is innate in the ISS professional is the construct under investigation. 
 ISS professionals have a significant responsibility to protect assets that belong to the 
organization for which they work.  Adversaries are almost constantly attempting to break 
through the defenses set up by information security departments.  A common competitor about 
whom an ISS professional must think is the computer hacker.  Sometimes these hackers are 
bored, intelligent youth looking for a thrill or trying to test their computing abilities (Xu et al., 
2013).  Other times, competing organizations may use techniques like social engineering or even 
overt hacking of a company’s network to gain competitive intelligence to use in the struggle to 
gain market share (Styles, 2013).  In the worst case, organizations or governments must defend 
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networks against state-sponsored hackers whose financial backing and unlimited timeframe 
allow for seemingly never-ending and unstoppable attacks, called advanced persistent threats.   
 ISS professionals must face these challenges with unflinching determination and 
dedication to their profession.  For those ISS workers who are devoted to their craft, the level of 
competitiveness in the face of insurmountable odds is staggering.  In light of the types of ISS 
professionals in the study’s classification, only those with a high level of competitiveness will 
meet this challenge with the levels of aggressive and highly competitive responses to fend off the 
most determined attackers.  On the opposite extreme, a type of ISS professional whose low level 
of competitiveness will lead him or her to be satisfied with installation and monitoring of 
externally-facing intrusion detection software was anticipated, for instance.  When an attack 
occurs, this latter type of ISS worker will rely solely on the alerts issued by the software and do 
only minimal investigation beyond the “canned” reports provided by the software vendor.    
H4: Trait competitiveness is related to class membership. 
 
2.6 Deceptiveness 
 
 We expect ISS professionals who aggressively protect his or her network from hackers, 
whose modus operandi relies largely on deceptive practices, to possess much the same, or higher, 
capability for deceptiveness.  Kevin Mitnick (2003), one of the most notorious early hackers, 
describes the numerous instances of social engineering as a means to breach almost every 
network he admits to accessing.  The role of ISS professional not only involves intrusion 
detection and log monitoring; it, also, requires preparing all employees for potential weaknesses 
in their organization’s security scheme.  Much to the chagrin of the ISS worker, their primary 
control of the “front door” is limited to adherence of all employees possessing security access to 
the digital assets to the security policy of the organization.  With a little deceptive social 
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engineering, a hacker can convincingly gain access to security credentials with ease.  To prepare 
the organization not to fall for phishing attacks, social engineering attempts, or even physical 
“tailgating” to gain physical access to sensitive data and areas of the company, the ISS 
professional must develop security policies and procedures to address all the varyingly deceptive 
means by which the security of the organization can be breached (Baskerville & Siponen, 2002). 
 Deceptive communication involves a message “purposely transmitted to foster a false 
belief or conclusion in a receiver” (Giordano & George, 2013, p. 211).  Depending on the 
communication medium, deception can be difficult to detect and to prevent.  In a group support 
systems context, Giordino & George (2013) found that groups participating in a complex task 
were more susceptible to deception.  Serious deception in collaborative environments where 
electronic communication media is used at significant risk, and groups performing highly 
complex tasks are even more susceptible to deceptive communication (Giordano & George, 
2013).  This implies that in a highly complex environment of information system security, even 
the ISS professional is susceptible to deceptive communication.  As the old adage goes, “you 
can’t kid a kidder;” however, applies to information security workers, because the aggressively 
productive ISS professional will, this study suggests, have the ability to be highly deceptive, 
which will positively influence his or her ability to detect deception by others. 
 Charlton et al. (1997) performed a meta-analysis on people’s judgment of their ability to 
detect deceptiveness and their confidence in the accuracy of their judgment.  The researchers 
found that people were more confident in judgment of truth over judgment of lies (DePaulo et 
al., 1997).  An ISS professional must confidently detect deception but not necessarily in 
statements made by individuals or organization threatening intrusion.  Instead, they must think 
through the possible deceptive attack vectors, determine which are potentially accurate, develop 
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a prevention mechanism and monitor its success.  They accomplish this through drawing hackers 
into scenarios too tempting for a hacker to resist, the honeypot (A. Gupta et al., 2010).  This is a 
form of deceptiveness, which allows the ISS professional to detect deceptiveness in hackers.  It 
is a difficult cycle of games of “chicken.”  ISS professionals have to either expose real digital 
assets to draw in a hacker or mask a benign digital asset in such a convincing manner that a 
hacker is drawn to it.  The deceptiveness required to play this game indicates the level of 
deceptiveness necessary for ISS professionals.  Since deceptiveness is a central characteristic of 
aggressively successful security workers, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H5: Deceptiveness is related to class membership. 
 
2.7 Distrust 
 
 Distrust is used in this study, as opposed to trust, to indicate that the primary 
characteristic in use by ISS professionals is an inherent distrust for anyone capable of attempting 
to attack the ISS worker’s organization’s digital assets.  Distrust is not an antonym of trust nor is 
it the absence of trust, regardless of how the word sounds.  In information security, the digital 
assets of a company are of the utmost value to the success of that company, and the security 
worker is charged with protecting those assets.  When the security worker trusts, he or she 
expects that unknown entities will not attempt to breach the network.  This is simply a naïve way 
of looking at today’s digital society.  The literature on trust is both deep and broad.  One aspect 
of trust is interpersonal trust and it is “an expectancy held by an individual or a group that the 
word, promise, verbal or written statement of another individual or group can be relied upon” 
(Rotter, 1967, p. 651).   Non-negative outcomes are the expectation when an information security 
person trusts the actions of another party in an environment of uncertainty (Bhattacharya et al., 
1998). Bhattacharya et al. provides a mathematical justification for the authors’ definition of 
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trust.  Further, in other studies, trust is defined in terms of an agency model (Shapiro, 1987).  
Within the framework of agency theory, trust is conveyed either formally or informally by a 
group or by an organization.  This form of trust, however, is not the type of trust (or distrust) that 
is the subject of this study.  Shapiro et al. (1987) focuses on impersonal trust, which occurs 
when, based on social convention or social ties, direct contact between two parties is unlikely.  
Distrust, this study contends, in many ways, is the opposite of this type of trust.  An ISS 
professional cannot, specifically, scrutinize, or evaluate the performance of a person prior to a 
security attack.  Therefore, rather than trusting that person, all unknown individuals are 
distrusted.   
 The distrust exhibited by ISS professionals suggested is similar to the distrust 
characteristics of the police personality, which states that a policeman develops a general distrust 
of everyone after seeing the side of humanity with which he or she must deal most often 
(Twersky-Glasner, 2005).  A person who enters law enforcement, may enter with an idealistic 
notion of helping society, but over time and with experience, he or she sees the worst side of 
most everyone encountered.  This exposure to the worst in many people can influence the 
attitude of the police officer toward everyone.  This is a significant issue in law enforcement and 
has led to numerous studies and attempts to address what most law enforcement agencies 
consider a problem. 
 In many ways, the ISS professional is at risk of the same change in attitude toward other 
computer professionals and even internal employees.  Distrust has been studied from many 
perspectives and in many disciplines.  Cho (2006) suggested that trust and distrust are distinct 
concepts that affect the behavioral intentions of exchange relationships in B2C interactions.  
Distrust has been viewed as an expectation that the other party’s actions will result in injury 
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(Luhmann, 1979).  Further, colleagues are distrusted due to incompetence, irresponsible, or even 
harmful actions (Lewicki et al., 1998).  In an organizational context, both Lewicki et al. (1998) 
and Kramer (1999) suggest distrust is correlated with other dispositional orientations such as 
belief about human nature.  Distrust has been addressed in the management literature quite 
extensively, but distrust in technical fields has been primarily the focus of marketing and 
information systems 
 This study addresses distrust, not from the perspective of whether a person is trusted or 
not; rather, the study’s interest is in the attitude of the ISS professional and the expectation he or 
she has on the behavior of other computer professionals or employees.   The type of distrust 
exhibited by the ISS professional is not one focused on team members in an organizational 
context.  This is not to imply that distrust as described by Lewicki et al. (1998) and Kramer 
(1999) is not present in an information security team; rather, the focus is on the distrust felt by 
the ISS professional similar to the distrust demonstrated in the police personality.  Thus, the 
following hypothesis is offered: 
H6: Distrust is related to class membership. 
 
2.8 Morality 
 
 Early work on morals focused on moral development and reasoning as cognitive-
development process in childhood through young adulthood (Piaget, 1932).  Kohlberg (1958) 
continued along this line of research by describing the development of moral stages in children 
and young adults.  The Defining Issues Test was developed to measure moral judgment and 
categorize them into stages of moral judgment development (Rest, 1975; Rest, Cooper, Coder, 
Masanz, & Anderson, 1974).  As a person develops, he/she moves through moral stages of 
development, and Rest’s (1973) research supported this by developing and validating principled 
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moral statements which indicate a person’s moral development.  Rest’s P score correlated with 
education-level and not with age, which indicates moral judgment is more closely related with 
developmental stage rather than age (Rest et al., 1974).  Further, it was determined that college 
students have higher moral judgment development than do students who do not continue their 
education beyond high school (Rest, 1975), and adults who do not continue their education into 
college measure moral judgment development equivalent to a college student.  Therefore, 
research shows the moral judgment developmental level of college students is a valid indicator of 
the majority of adults.   
 A person’s “self-conception organized around a set of moral traits” defines a person’s 
moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002).  Characteristics of morality as described by moral 
identity may be identified by the following adjectives: caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, 
generous, helpful, hard-working, honest, and kind.  A person’s moral identity is comprised of 
outward actions in the person’s environment and the person’s self-concept of moral traits.  These 
two components work together to form the moral identity, but they can be inconsistent when the 
actions in the world do not reflect the internal self-concept.  For example, the person who backs 
into another car in a parking lot and leaves a note stating, “I am writing this note so the people 
who saw me hit your car and are watching me now think I am identifying myself and giving you 
my contact information” may not have an internalization component consistent with his/her 
symbolization component.   The aspects of morality, within the context of moral identity, help 
define the important characteristics of his or her morality, which suggests: 
H7: Morality is related to class membership. 
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Table 2 – Hypotheses & Assessment Methods 
 
 Hypothesis Method of Assessment 
H1 Information Systems Security professionals can be 
categorized into classes ranging from passively-
oriented (reactive) to aggressively-oriented 
(proactive) mindsets toward information systems 
security 
Latent Class Analysis 
H2 One class of the types of will be significantly larger 
than other types 
Latent Class Analysis 
H3 Creativity will predict class membership Multinomial Logistic Regression 
H4 Trait Competitiveness will predict class membership Multinomial Logistic Regression 
H5 Deceptiveness will predict class membership Multinomial Logistic Regression 
H6 Distrust will predict class membership Multinomial Logistic Regression 
H7 Morality will predict class membership Multinomial Logistic Regression 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODS 
 
 The study consists of two stages of data gathering and analysis.  First, to assist in 
determining the most informative questions to ask, which was used as input to the latent class 
analysis, a Delphi study was conducted.  After the Delphi study was completed, a survey was 
developed to assess the characteristics in the research model.  The information from the Delphi 
study and relevant information security literature were used to develop six questions for the 
survey that are used to classify the types of ISS professional is contained in the sample.  In the 
pilot study, the questions were included in the survey and the survey was given to computer 
science and MIS students.  In the primary study, practicing ISS professionals were the focus.  
The survey contains a total of 57 questions, including the six described above.  In addition to the 
questions to aid in determining the classification, the remaining 51 questions measure creativity, 
trait competitiveness, deceptiveness, distrust, and morality using recently developed instruments 
that have shown to have good psychometric properties.  A more detailed explanation of the 
instruments used is provided below.  The data from the survey is first used to perform a latent 
class analysis to determine classes (or types) of ISS professional using the six questions 
influenced by the Delphi study.  The primary researcher will review the classification and 
identify the number of classifications indicated and then will regress each of the classifications 
on the characteristics assessed in the other questions in the survey using multinomial logistic 
regression.  The intent of the multinomial logistic regression is to determine which constructs 
best influence membership in each of the classes determined in the latent class analysis.  A more 
detailed explanation of the logistic regression process is provided below. 
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3.1 Delphi Study 
 
 One of the challenges of the study’s approach is to find scientifically valid questions to 
provide data to be used in the latent class analysis.  The Delphi technique was chosen based on 
its long history and use in the information systems and social science fields (Landeta, 2006).  
The Delphi process is a repetitive process that seeks to build a common understanding and a 
consensus among experts in a specific area where theory is not developed or is conflicting.  An 
advantage, in the context of information security, is the anonymity of the participant, which 
lends itself to more open input from participants.  This openness is one of the greatest advantages 
of the Delphi technique, because it encourages honest and thorough input.  Although it has its 
critics, the technique has shown benefits in situations where expert input into the method for 
determining ISS professional classification is required.  The current study, uses the traditional 
form of the Delphi technique to guide the research to questions that practicing information 
security professionals find helpful when determining the effectiveness of other information 
security personnel.  The study’s use of Delphi was to provide information that can be used as a 
springboard to developing items for the survey instrument that will provide separation among 
ISS professionals as they respond to the survey.  This will lead to a more effective classification 
and more applicable research.  
3.1.1	   Delphi	  Participants	  
 
 The researcher requested participation from chapter presidents listed on the Information 
Systems Security Association (ISSA).  ISSA was chosen based on its stated purpose to “the 
community of choice for international cybersecurity professionals dedicated to advancing 
individual growth, managing technology risk and protecting critical information and 
infrastructure” (ISSA, n.d., p. 1).  The stated goal of the ISSA is to promote information 
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management practices which achieve confidentiality, availability, and integrity of member 
organizations’ digital assets.  The association holds conferences and supports the education of its 
membership through training, through information availability on its website, and through 
information sharing between and within local chapters.  Included on the page listing each chapter 
is the name of the local chapter president and an e-mail contact for the chapter.  As the leader of 
each local chapter, the president directs the activities of the chapter, determines relevant security 
topics to discus, and schedules sessions to enhance the membership’s professional development.  
To lead a group of ISS professionals, the president has prior experience of the topic of 
information systems security.  In addition to personal expertise in ISS, the president serves as a 
conduit for information from the national organization, which further supports the president’s 
recognition as a leader in the information systems security field to hold the position.  It is for this 
reason that presidents of local ISSA chapters were a clear choice for a sample of information 
systems security experts. 
3.1.2	   Delphi	  Round	  1	  –	  Questions	  
 
 Participants were sent an e-mail explaining the importance of their participation in the 
study and the impact the study can have on the field of information system security.  Another 
intent of the text of the e-mail was to establish credibility for the primary researcher and, 
hopefully, bypass the typical deletion of e-mails such as this when received by busy ISS experts.  
The primary researcher has experience in a role similar to the respondents and a significant 
challenge to gathering data from this population is simply getting possible participants to 
respond.  Thus, the wording of the e-mail was carefully crafted.  The question posed to the ISSA 
chapter presidents was:  
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What question could you ask information systems security professionals (job 
candidate, colleague, etc.) to determine whether thy will be/are an effective information 
security worker? Not necessarily tool- or environment-specific questions. 
 
 The first round of the Delphi study was sent, via e-mail, to the ISSA chapter presidents.  
The e-mail contained a brief introduction with a “thank you” statement for agreeing to 
participate, instructions explaining the use of a survey service to facilitate the capture of the 
participants’ responses, a URL to the site, an explanation of the study, and instructions 
explaining how the participants can access the site.  The URL was not a clickable link to avoid 
possible participants discarding the e-mail for security reasons.  The participants were given ten 
days to respond to the questions before they received a reminder to respond.  The e-mail sent is 
included in Appendix C as Initial Delphi Participation E-Mail. 
 ISSA chapter presidents choosing to participate in the Delphi study were presented with 
an instructional page explaining the context of the study and the process.  The respondent was 
greeted with a “Thank you” message for participating in the study.  The instructions explained 
the Delphi process as a three-round process in which they will provide data for the first stage of 
the research.  Further, the instruction stated that the participant’s e-mail address was needed to 
allow the researcher to compile the results from this questionnaire and to provide the respondent 
an opportunity to rank the questions provided by his or her peers.  The third and final round of 
the Delphi study, stated in the instructions, was to allow the respondent to confirm the ranking of 
the questions, which were provided by their peers.  Finally, a statement indicating that the study 
has been reviewed by the University of Mississippi’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) was 
provided to the respondent. 
 After either confirming the e-mail address from the link provided in the e-mail address 
above, which was passed into the Qualtrics survey, or the respondent was allowed to provide an 
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alternative e-mail address, the respondent was taken to the next page of the questionnaire.  The 
second page of the Qualtrics questionnaire asked the respondent to provide the following 
demographic information: 
1. Age 
2. Years in Information Systems (Information Technology, In the computer field, etc.) 
3. Years in Information Systems Security (Information Security) 
4. Sex 
5. Job Title 
6. Industry of [respondent’s] current company 
 
 After the respondent provided information answering the question, the questionnaire 
thanked the respondent and states that “in about 5 business days, you will receive an e-mail at the 
address you provided above with instruction on the next step.”  The Qualtrics software then 
thanked the respondent for the time taken to complete the survey. 
3.1.3	   Delphi	  Round	  2	  –	  Ranking	  
 
 As responses were recorded by Qualtrics, the information provided by the respondents 
was downloaded, with the final download performed on the fifth business day after the initial e-
mail was sent.  The questions were extracted from the downloaded responses, duplicates were 
removed by the primary researcher and an independent researcher not involved in the study.  The 
responses were compiled into a list and sorted on the 12th through 20th characters in the question 
provided.  Although this did not randomly order the responses, the intent of sorting on an 
arbitrary string in the response is to re-sort the responses so that each participant’s responses are 
not grouped together.  This is to, as best as can be performed, mix the responses to prevent any 
individual respondent from recognizing his or her group of questions and rank them highest.  As 
time had passed prior to the ranking, the hope was that a respondent would have forgotten the 
data provided by him or her, which served to reduce bias toward his or her own questions. 
  35 
 The respondents to Round 1 of the Delphi study were sent an e-mail with instructions and 
a link to a Qualtrics survey containing the list of questions provided by all of the participants in 
Round 1 in a format that allows each respondent to order the questions from 1 to 10.  The e-mail 
is included in Appendix C – Communication as Delphi Ranking E-Mail. 
 The participants in the first round copied and pasted the URL in the e-mail into a 
browser, which took them to the opening statement for the second round.  The statement 
displayed on the first page of the Qualtrics questionnaire is: 
Thank you for your responses to our question regarding identifying effective 
information security professionals.  Please rank the questions presented on the next page 
in order of importance in determining effective information security workers, with the 
questions at the top best identifying effectiveness and, at the bottom, questions you feel 
provide the least information to determine information security effectiveness. 
 
Please provide your response by [date], and, again, this research is not possible 
without your input.  So, please take a short time to assist in this research. 
 
This study has been reviewed by The University of Mississippi’s Institutional Review 
Board (IRB).  The IRB has determined that this study fulfills the human research subject 
protections obligations required by state and federal law and University policies.  If you 
have any questions, concerns, or reports regarding your rights as a participant of 
research, please contact the IRB at (662) 915-7482. 
 
 Each respondent proceeded to a single page of a Qualtrics survey and rank the questions 
received in Round 1 in order of importance in assessing a person’s effectiveness as an ISS 
professional. 
3.1.4	   Delphi	  Round	  3	  –	  Confirmation	  
 
 E-mail was sent to the respondents in Round 2, which enabled each participant to confirm 
the rankings and make any changes each felt necessary.  After the confirmation was received, the 
questions and their rank were used to develop questions included in the survey of ISS 
professionals.  The six questions were used in a latent class analysis to classify information 
security types. 
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3.2 Research Design 
 
 An emphasis of this study was to perform a person-centered approach to information 
system security.  To that end, a Delphi study was conducted to determine questions that could 
formed the basis of the classification of ISS professionals.  This classification is important to 
show the characteristics that make individuals effective in a wide array of security roles.  
Further, it demonstrates the diversity of responsibilities in information security and suggests that 
an aspect of information systems critical to both organizational and national security that cannot 
be simply populated with the best technically competent individual; rather, an emphasis on 
personality characteristics is necessary to keep digital assets secure.  First, however, the 
researcher must determine the types of information security professionals that are currently 
practicing in the security field.   To determine this classification of security professionals, latent 
class analysis (LCA) was used.  The class indicators were developed from the ETSI Information 
Security Incident taxonomy based on the Delphi survey items resulting from the Delphi study 
that was perfumed in stage 1 of the study (Rennoch & Gaudin, 2013).  The survey items used in 
the LCA contained multiple categories per item in the first four items, and the last two questions 
had dichotomous responses.  The four multi-category items were pooled to make them 
dichotomous items for use in the latent class analysis.  Menard (2010) suggests pooling multi-
category items when use of binary items helps in the analysis without loss of meaning.   
3.3 Measures 
 
 The current study has two distinct sets of measures that are included in the survey 
instrument.  The results of the Delphi study were used as a basis for developing the first set of 
items to be included in the survey.  Additionally, existing instruments to use in measuring the 
latent personality traits were included in the survey.  The following section describes the survey 
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participants, the two sets of questions that were included on the survey, and two types of data 
analysis approaches to analyze the resulting data.   
3.3.1	   Delphi/ETSI	  ISI	  Taxonomy	  Integration	  
 
 The Delphi study respondents provided many useful questions to guide the development 
of questions used in the latent class analysis.  Additionally, the ETSI ISI taxonomy provides very 
specific attributes and categories of incidents and vulnerabilities, which can be used to determine 
the breadth of work an information security professional is expected to perform (Rennoch & 
Gaudin, 2013).  By using the specificity of the ETSI ISI taxonomy in classifying the types of 
incidents and vulnerabilities and the general nature of the questions provided by the Delphi 
respondents, the researcher developed questions that covered the breadth of the Delphi 
responses.  For example, a highly ranked Delphi response was “what is the biggest challenge you 
have faced in securing your past or current employer.”  The ETSI ISI taxonomy describes an 
Origin attribute that details corresponding Categories such as Accident, Unintentional act, 
Careless act, and Malicious act.  These categories of the attribute Origin in the ETSI ISI 
taxonomy represent four threats or challenges to a network.  Thus, by combining the Delphi 
respondents’ questions with the ETSI ISI Origin list of categories, the researchers arrived at the 
following survey question: 
Which of the following presents the biggest threat to your network? 
1. Accident 
2. Unintentional act 
3. Irresponsible/careless act by internal employee 
4. Malicious act on a digital asset 
 
The remaining five questions used in the LCA were developed in a manner similar to the process 
described above.  Upon completing the questions used for the LCA, the list of questions were 
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sent to practicing information security professionals who were asked to confirm that the 
questions developed adequately interpreted the breadth of the Delphi respondents’ questions. 
3.3.2	   Survey	  Items	  
 
 The survey consists of 51 questions that measure the type of ISS professional of the 
respondent as well as personality traits such as creativity, morality, deceptiveness, and distrust.  
The specific survey items for each of these constructs can be found in Appendix A, as can the 
items for the dependent variable, Information Systems Security Class.  The personality items 
have been drawn from current studies where the instrument was either developed for the study or 
simply used as part of the recent study.  To determine convergent and discriminant validity, a 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was performed and the factor loadings were assessed.  
3.4 Pilot Study 
 
 A pilot study was conducted using computer science and information systems students 
from a mid-sized southern university.  The pilot study involved a survey of fifty-one questions.  
Five of the questions were adapted from the Delphi study with the remaining pilot questions 
comprised of instruments from measuring creativity, trait competitiveness, deceptiveness, 
distrust, and morality.   Following the pilot study, the original IPIP questions were replaced with 
more recent survey scales for use in in the main study. 
3.4.1	   Pilot	  Study	  Participants	  
 
 Students were invited to participate in the study through the use of bonus points offered 
by the professor or through the opportunity to be selected to receive a $20 gift card from a local 
business.  If the gift card approach was used by the professor of a class asked to participate, the 
gift card was awarded through the use of a sign-in sheet where the participants wrote only their 
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students IDs and no other identifying information as they left the survey.  The list of student IDs 
were delivered to the professor along with a gift card.  The professor randomly chose a 
participant in the class to receive the gift card using a method determined by the professor. 
 Two hundred students were given the opportunity to participate with the expectation of 
having 75 student participants.  A total of 106 responses to the pilot study were received. 
3.5 Main Study 
 
 The Phase II study for this project involved a survey given to practicing information 
systems security professionals.  These respondents provided the basis for security professional 
classification and for the analysis of the influence of the personality characteristics on class 
membership. 
3.5.1	   Main	  Study	  Participants	  
 
 Participants for the main study included working adults in the information technology 
and security industry.  A variety of sources were used to achieve 330 respondents from 23 
different industries with a median age range of 29 to 33. Respondents were contacted through 
personal LinkedIn connections and LinkedIn information security groups.  The potential 
respondents were asked to forward the link to the survey to colleagues working in the security 
field.  A large number of respondents forwarded the Qualtrics survey link to five or more 
personal business contacts.  Furthermore, additional respondents were attained from regional and 
national information security groups on LinkedIn.  Almost 500 participants responded to the 
survey but a large number of the respondents abandoned the survey without answering more than 
10 of the questions assessing characteristics of the respondent.  These surveys were removed 
from the study.  
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 The participants were provided a link to a Qualtrics survey containing the questions 
resulting form Stage 1 of this study, forty-four questions assessing personality traits of the 
participants, and three questions used to control for age, education, and sex.  The average length 
to respond to the survey was approximately 12 minutes.  All respondents answered the questions 
between April 21 and June 5, 2014.  The surveys were closed on June 5, 2014 and no additional 
responses were allowed.  
 
3.5.2	   Latent	  Class	  Analysis	  
 
 One of the issues in LCA is the sparseness of the contingency table (Collins & Lanza, 
2010).  If a study does not contain an adequate number of observations, the table against which 
all of the analysis is performed can contain too few observations, leading to empty cells when 
viewed as a grid.  Sparseness of the contingency table is a function of the number of observations 
(N), specifically, the number of observations divided by the number of possible cells in the table 
(W).  The recommended minimum number of observations is !! > 5, where W is calculated, for 
binary class indicators used in this study, as 2!.  The exponent, q is the number of binary 
questions.  Thus, the formula used in this study to calculate the minimum number of participants 
for a questionnaire containing six binary class indicator questions was !!! > 5.  Solving for N 
gives 𝑁 > 5 2! > 320.  Therefore, the minimum number of usable observations, to provide the 
recommended minimum for LCA use, was 320 usable observations. 
 Traditionally, researchers employing latent class analysis have used a single-step 
approach in which the covariates are included in the analysis in the same process in which the 
latent classes are determined (Clark & Bengt, 2009).  Although this method avoids the problem 
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of incorrect estimates and standard errors by allowing the individual observations to be fractional 
members of all classes, it is computationally intensive due to the number of variables in the 
analysis.  Additionally, the auxiliary variables may influence class membership, which may 
change how the latent classes are interpreted.   
 A three-step process has been proposed that involves first determining class membership 
prior to including auxiliary variables (Asparouhov & Muthen, 2013) to analyze only the 
classification identified in the LCA.  To confirm the classification, the entropy of the latent class 
model was calculated to find values higher than 0.6 which indicates better classification of 
individuals (Asparouhov & Bengt, 2013).  Performing a multinomial logistic regression using the 
most likely classes saved as a result of the LCA can be performed if the entropy value of the 
LCA is close to 0.8 (B. O. Muthén, n.d.).  After the LCA, a multinomial logistic regression is 
performed; so, to remain consistent with the suggestions of Asparouhov & Muthen (2013) and 
include all of the predictor variables in the analysis to estimate the multinomial model, the 
covariates are listed as auxiliary variables in the LCA.   
3.5.3	   Confirmatory	  Factor	  Analysis	  
 
 A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was run on the items measuring the personality 
characteristics creativity, trait competitiveness, deceptiveness, distrust, and morality.  Reliability 
was calculated on each latent variable.  When the CFA did not provide adequate model fit, the 
advice of Byrne (2012) was used to achieve adequate model fit of CFI > 0.9, RMSEA < 0.7, 
according to Hair etal. (2010). 
3.5.3	   Multinomial	  Logistic	  Regression	  
 
 Multinomial logistic regression was used as the third step of the 3-step analysis, as 
suggested by Asparouhov & Muthen (2013).  Following the technique offered by Hosemer and 
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Lemeshow (2013).  The fit of the individual variables was assessed prior to performing the 
multivariable multinomial logistic regression.  Colinearity was assessed and offending variables 
removed, and, finally, multivariable multinomial logistic regression was performed with all 
variables (Hosmer, Lemeshow, & Sturdivant, 2013).  Following the first round of multinomial 
logistic regression, likelihood ratio tests were used to assess the fit of each variables (B. O. 
Muthén & Muthén, n.d.).  Additionally, the likelihood ratio tests were confirmed with Wald 
tests.  After the model fit was assessed and confirmed, a final multinomial logistic regression 
was performed with the three remaining factors and covariates serving as control variables 
(Hosmer et al., 2013). 
 Figure 3 contains a graphic representation of the research methodology used in the study. 
 
Figure 3 – The Delphi-Driven Latent Class Analysis Method 
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
4.1 Delphi Study Results 
 
 The study utilized the Delphi technique as a way to determine questions to use during 
phase 2 of the study, which involves determining the types of ISS professionals, which will lead 
to a classification of ISS professionals.  The goal was a set of four to ten questions that result in 
categorical responses that are added to a survey of ISS workers.  The responses to these 
questions were used in a latent class analysis, which is described in the methods section of this 
paper.  To arrive at a list of questions that results in a practical classification of ISS 
professionals, the investigators chose the Delphi method on which to base questions used to 
calculate the classification to leverage security experts’ opinions.  Structured interviews are a 
valid means to extract information from expert security professionals; however, without 
subsequent, independent confirmation of their opinions, the questions could be less reliable than 
Delphi-based questions.  Therefore, Delphi was chosen due to the four tenets of a Delphi study: 
anonymity, controlled feedback, group response, and reduced time involved in identifying, 
convincing to participate, and then interviewing numerous security experts.  
 The best approach to a Delphi study is to contact potential participants through direct 
means of communication such as face-to-face or by telephone.  In the case of this study with the 
population of information security professionals, data indicating name, address, and/or telephone 
contact information was not readily available.  The best source of information found by the 
researchers was the Information Systems Security Association (ISSA) list of chapters (ISSA, 
n.d.).  The chapter page on the ISSA site listed the name of each chapter, the name of the 
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president of each chapter and the chapter’s official e-mail address.  Most of the e-mail addresses 
were of the form president@issa-location.org, where ‘location’ is the chapter name or an 
abbreviation of the chapter name.  This inhibited the investigator’s attempts to adhere to the 
“high-touch” nature of a traditional Delphi study.  The Delphi study returned somewhat useful 
results, but were different responses than anticipated.  Although the results led to useful 
questions added to the survey, the process of the Delphi study went unexpectedly, too. 
 The process of the Delphi study did not run as smoothly as originally designed, and the 
results reflected an understanding of the questions asked during the Delphi process that was 
different than the original intent of the researcher.  However, the broad understanding of the 
primary focus of the Delphi question provided a better foundation upon which to build the 
survey instrument.  After a brief period of trying to recover from the “lemons” the researchers 
were dealt, lemonade was the result.  This led to a better set of questions to use for the 
classification of ISS professional and to a better study, overall.  Below, the results of the Delphi 
study are presented and the ultimate questions developed from the results are presented. 
4.1.1	   Delphi	  Participant-­‐Supplied	  Questions	  Results	  
 
 Participants for the Delphi study were chosen from the Information Systems Security 
Association (ISSA) web site, which contains a list of the names of each local chapter.  The e-
mail listed in the Delphi portion of the Methods section, above.  The intent of the e-mail was to 
establish credibility for the primary researcher and, hopefully, bypass the typical deletion of e-
mails such as this when received by busy ISS experts.  See Appendix B – Tables for Delphi 
Rounds and Statistics for the information regarding respondents. 
 There were very few company e-mail addresses listed on the site.  Most non-ISSA-related 
e-mails were personal GMail or other free e-mail services.  In five attempts to follow a corporate 
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website to get a phone number and to make contact with the person listed on the ISSA site, the 
primary researcher was unsuccessful in multiple attempts for all five contacts for various 
reasons.  Thus, the ISSA chapter e-mail addresses were used to send an e-mail requesting 
participation in the Delphi study.  Additionally, many of the questions to ask that were provided 
by the Delphi experts were very good differentiating questions but many were simply focused on 
the binary selection decision with which ISS managers are concerned, and did not differentiate  
the differences among practicing ISS team members.  The managers participating in the Delphi 
study were focused on providing questions they used to determine whether to hire an ISS person 
or not rather than on the questions to differentiate between the various types of ISS professionals. 
 The responses from the original e-mail to 82 participants did not yield as many responses 
as anticipated.  In fact, only six people responded to the initial e-mail by filling out the Qualtrics 
questionnaire.  It may be that the original e-mail tried too hard to show the primary investigator’s 
experience in I.T. to warrant their cooperation in the study.  Possibly, potential respondents felt 
that the e-mail “tried too hard” to convince them that the request was legitimate, or, the potential 
participants were simply unwilling to take yet another survey from an unknown person. 
Regardless of the reason, a low percentage responded to the initial request, which reinforced the 
knowledge that Delphi is a technique to be used in a setting where the potential respondents are 
available for contact.  In the case of ISSA presidents, they were not.  Therefore, a second attempt 
was necessary to get adequate response.  This lead to a more direct e-mail with the requirements 
of the respondents even more clearly spelled out.  Thus, a second e-mail was sent to the chapter 
presidents that had not responded to the initial request, approximately ten business days after the 
initial e-mail.  The email is included in Appendix C – Communications as Delphi Second 
Request For Expert Participation. 
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The second e-mail resulted in an additional twelve respondents, which was not quite as 
high as the researcher had planned, but it was an acceptable number of responses.  After 
removing responses with no e-mail addresses allowing the investigator to continue the Delphi 
technique with the participants, Round 1 of the Delphi study resulted in 22 questions, with two 
duplicates.  After removing duplicated questions, twenty questions were sent back to the 
respondents for ranking.  The questions resulting from Round 1 of the Delphi study can be found 
in Appendix B – Tables as Delphi Questions from Experts. 
4.1.2	   Delphi	  Ranking	  Results	  
 
 After closing the questionnaire to participants, the Delphi study finished with eight usable 
responses.  Unfortunately, many of the questions they provided demonstrated a 
misunderstanding of the intent of the question asked in the Delphi study.  The respondents 
appear to have interpreted the question as asking “what interview questions would you ask an 
information security job candidate?”  The questionnaire did offer a job candidate as a “such as” 
example, but it also mentioned colleagues, as well.  However, the results of the first round of the 
Delphi contained many questions that are irrelevant to this study.  However, under the rules of 
Delphi, the respondents were sent a list of all questions and asked to rank them in order of 
effectiveness in assessing information security effectiveness.  The e-mail to the respondents for 
the second round of the Delphi study is included in Appendix C – Communication as Delphi 
Second Request for Expert Participation. 
 Fortunately, the resulting ranking weeded out the uninformative interview questions 
received from Round 1.  Of the 11 respondents from Round 1, eight sent back rankings.  The 
respondents were asked to rank the questions relevance to assessing a person’s information 
security effectiveness.  At this point, the participants were apparently still considering them 
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interview questions, but, fortunately, the resulting ranking identified questions that could be 
easily adapted to a survey format.  Others, however, were more difficult to adapt directly to a 
survey format, because they were too open-ended like interview questions can be.   
 To calculate the rankings, the top ten items provided by each of the eight information 
security experts were used.  Then, the unranked questions were assigned a value of eleven.  
Some of the respondents ranked one through ten, another ranked one through twenty and a third, 
for example, ranked one through fourteen and left the remaining six questions blank.  Since the 
instructions in the e-mail requesting ranking allowed for ranking the top ten, if needed, the 
researcher decided to keep the top ten items and assign the value 11 to the remaining, unranked 
questions.  This decision introduced a level of consistency to all respondents’ rankings.  For 
instance, if one respondent ranked item E a rank of 2 and another assigned it a rank of 17 and 
another did not rank it in the top ten, taking the average of the rankings would calculate on 
average of 9.5.  The third respondent, however, did not have question E in her top ten; so, 
without assigning a default value for unranked items, the results may be artificially high. 
 Further, to be consistent, any respondent that ranked questions beyond 10, their 11th and 
greater ranking were all changed to 11.  This gave all items with no ranking the same value; so, 
when the average ranking was calculated, no item ranked below 11, but many ranked higher than 
10.  It simply was not valid to either force an 11 through 20 ranking or to allow the average 
calculations to include 11 through 20 rankings, for those who did them.  After the average 
rankings were calculate, the respondents were given an opportunity to confirm the ranking or 
make any changes.  The respondents were not shown the actual average ranking calculations.  
They were simply shown the ordered list.  None of the respondents offered any alternative order 
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to the questions.  The final rankings can be found in Appendix B – Tables as Delphi Final 
Ranking of Expert’s Questions. 
4.1.3	   Final	  Delphi	  Results	  
 
 Delphi studies are high-touch processes, and the context of information security presents 
an environment where high touch is extremely difficult.  Optimally, 15 or more respondents in 
the final round of a Delphi study is best; however, the questions received by the eight 
respondents were adequate to use in developing scientifically valid questions to use in the survey 
for the classification analysis.  To develop the questions to be added to phase II survey of 
information security professional, the ETSI information security incident taxonomy (Rennoch & 
Gaudin, 2013) was used.  This taxonomy details and organizes the types of incidents that can 
occur in the context of information systems security.  It identifies categories of the sources of the 
incident, the actions taken by the sources of the incident, the consequences of types of incidents, 
and many categories of events that occur when a digital asset is either attempted to be breached 
or is actually breached.  By using the ETSI ISI Taxonomy, the study presents categorical 
responses to assess the type of information systems security person a participant in the Phase II 
survey. 
 Appendix A, Information Security Classification contains the questions derived from the 
results of the Delphi study as well as from the ETSI ISI Taxonomy.  Where appropriate, the 
questions resulting from the Delphi study along with its proxy or re-wording are presented.   
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4.2 Main Study Results 
 
4.2.1	   Latent	  Class	  Analysis	  Results	  
 
 To test the existence of an information security classification, a latent class analysis was 
run on 330 respondents leading to an optimal model of six classes.  To determine the optimal 
number of classes contained in the data, the researcher is responsible for evaluating the data 
using many different potential classes and determining which provides the best classification of 
the types, of information security professionals.   The first test in determining the optimal model 
is a test of absolute fit.  Collins & Lanza (2010) emphasize the importance of parsimony as a 
philosophical principle in research, which states that a simple model is preferred to a more 
elaborate one.  Therefore, in this study, the goal is to find the model with the least number of 
classes that explains the data.  To that end, the process of determining the number of classes 
began with a 2-class model and looked at absolute model fit, first.  In LCA, the null hypothesis is 
a test of independence (Collins & Lanza, 2010).  If the observed data are unlikely, then there is 
strong evidence to reject the null hypothesis.  In LCA, to fail to reject the null hypothesis of 
independence indicates that the model being tested is the population model that produced the 
observed data.  To assist in testing for absolute model fit, MPlus produces two chi-square test of 
model fit for the categorical outcomes, Pearson Chi-Square and Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square.  
As models are tested, starting with a 2-class model, the researcher first viewed these tests of 
absolute model fit before continuing to the tests for relative model fit.  After determining the 
model had a good absolute fit, the relative fit was addressed to make the final decision regarding 
the number of classes that optimally explained the number of classes.   
 Nylund, Asporohov, & Muthen (2007) evaluated popular methods of determining an 
appropriate number of classes in a latent class model, often called class enumeration.  A popular 
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statistical indicator for deciding the number of classes in a study’s population is to rely on the 
lowest Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) (Woo & Allen, 2013).   Statistical software 
packages, such as MPlus, that contain latent class analysis modules provide a number of statistics 
to help the researcher discern the appropriate number of classes (Nylund et al., 2007).  Nyland, et 
al. (2007) performed a simulation study that compared several common class enumeration 
techniques such as AIC, BIC, and the adjusted BIC with other, non-information-criterion (IC) 
techniques with other approaches such as Lo-Mendell-Rubin fit index and the Bootstrapped 
likelihood ratio test (BLRT).  Further, the authors found that chi-square difference tests for 
determining the number of classes are not applicable in LCA due to regularity conditions not 
being met.  The difference in likelihoods of a number of classes (k) compared to its k-1 model is 
not chi-square distributed. 
 Therefore, this study uses the BLRT as the primary statistic to assist in determining the 
appropriate number of classes found in the LCA (Nylund et al., 2007).  Table 3 shows a 
comparison of the model with a different number of classes.  Both the BIC & the BLRT are 
reported in this table, but the BLRT was the test that best identified the optimal model in 
conjunction with another very important statistic, entropy.  Entropy indicates the level of class 
separation, with a higher number indicating more clearly identified clusters from which the 
classes are determined.  For instance, Model 1, the 2-class model, has a significant BLRT p-
value and the lowest BIC; however, entropy of this model is 0.546.  Recall from a discussion in 
chapter 3 that .6 is the minimum value for entropy to adequately separate the observations into 
identifiable classes (Asparouhov & Muthen, 2013).  Therefore, Model 1 was eliminated.  Models 
2 & 3 showed BLRT p-values of 0.065 & 0.092, respectively, which are significant at the 𝛼 = 0.1 level.  Model 4, the 5-class model, does not have a significant BLRT p-value and is, 
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thus, eliminated, along with Model 6, the 7-class model for the same reason.  Execution of the 
latent class analysis for Model 8 resulted in a local maxima and was eliminated due to inadequate 
calculation results.   
 
Table 3 – Comparison of Latent Class Models 
Model	  
Number	  
of	  
Classes	  
Pearson	  𝜒!/	  
Likelihood	  	  
Ratio	  𝜒!	  
p-­‐values	   Loglikelihood	   BIC	  
#	  of	  free	  
parameters	   Entropy	  
Bootstrapped	  LRT	  
(k	  vs.	  k-­‐1	  classes)	  
p-­‐value	  
1	   2	   0.005/0.001	   -­‐1171.071	   2417.5	   13	   0.546	   <	  0.001*	  
2	   3	   0.006/0.004	   -­‐1162.619	   2441.219	   20	   0.628	   0.065**	  
3	   4	   0.050/0.027	   -­‐1154.093	   2464.762	   27	   0.878	   0.092**	  
4	   5	   0.099/0.066	   -­‐1147.623	   2492.415	   34	   0.766	   0.192	  
5	   6	   0.428/0.244	   -­‐1140.106	   2517.976	   41	   0.785	   0.040*	  
6	   7	   0.358/0.261	   -­‐1136.028	   2550.412	   48	   0.745	   0.500	  
*Significant	  at	  𝛼 = 0.05	  
**Significant	  at	  𝛼 = 0.10	  
 
 Thus, Model 5, the 6-class model, meets all of the criteria for the optimal model – non-
significant Pearson & LRT, significant BLRT p-value and entropy greater than 0.6.  In fact, the 
entropy value of Model 5 is adequate to enable the use of a particularly helpful technique in the 
subsequent multinomial logistic regression, which will be addressed later in this chapter. 
 Questions used for the latent indicators are listed in Appendix A.  Questions 1, 2, 3, & 4 
contained more than two options from which the respondent was required to select only a single 
response and were pooled to result in a binary response to the question.  Question 5 & 6 included 
only two possibilities each.  The questions used in the LCA were developed from the ETSI 
Information Security Incident Taxonomy guided by results of the Delphi study discussed earlier.  
Using the advice of Collins and Lanza (2010) to ensure adequate observations in the LCA and 
for parsimony, class indicator responses were pooled into responses that resulted in a binary 
decision, yet retained meaningful information. 
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Figure 4 – Security Professional Classification Imbalance 
 
Table 4 – LCA Class Assignment 
Class	   Name	   Count	   Percentage	  
1	   Passive	  Monitor	   21	   6.40%	  
2	   Active	  Planner	   25	   7.60%	  
3	   Manifest	  Technical	  Investigator	   42	   12.70%	  
4	   General	  Monitor	   55	   16.70%	  
5	   Active	  Investigator	   14	   4.20%	  
6	   General	  Protector	   173	   52.40%	  
 
 
 Figure 4 highlights the imbalance that occurs in information security departments in even 
large organization.  Consistent with social identity theory, security professionals gravitate toward 
other security workers with similar characteristics, and the figure illustrates the imbalance in 
mindsets that can occur.  Table 4 shows the number and percentages of respondents placed in 
each of the six classes by the LCA.  The items showing the most diversity in their ability to 
influence class membership are responses related to damage to the organization, challenge of 
security projects, level of commitment to security, and investigative skills.  In Table 5, the 
probability of a respondent possessing skills to investigate a security event that is no longer an 
active exhibit the highest probability and members of Class 6 have a 67.7% probability of 
choosing this type of investigation compared to choosing to investigate a threat that is actively 
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underway.  Members of Class 5 have a probability approaching 100% of selecting an inactive 
threat over an ongoing one.  The other classes’ probabilities fall between 67.7% and 100% 
probability.  Thus, the status of a threat does not uniquely identify class membership.  The same 
is true about the intent of the threat.  Oddly, the probability a respondent will prefer to 
investigate a non-malicious threat is higher for all classes than the challenge of investigating 
malicious threats.  The remaining four items influencing class membership show more diverse 
item-response probabilities. 
Table 5 - Item Response Probabilities 
	  
Passive	  	  
Monitor	  
Active	  
Planner	  
Manifest	  
Technical	  
Investigator	  
General	  
Monitor	  
Active	  
Investigator	  
General	  
Protector	  
	  	  
Class	  1	  
(n=21)	  
Class	  2	  
(n=25)	  
Class	  3	  	  
(n=42)	  
Class	  4	  
(n=55)	  
Class	  5	  
(n=14)	  
Class	  6	  
(n=173)	  
1.	  Completed	  Threat	  
Threat	  no	  longer	  active	   0.798	   0.720	   0.871	   0.790	   1.000	   0.677	  
Threat	  actively	  underway	   0.202	   0.280	   0.129	   0.210	   0.000	   0.323	  
2.	  Damage	  	  
Loss	  of	  Reputation/Confidentiality	   0.315	   0.000	   1.000	   0.607	   0.000	   1.000	  
Loss	  of	  Asset	   0.685	   1.000	   0.000	   0.393	   1.000	   0.000	  
3.	  Security	  Project	  Challenge	  
Technical	  Project	   0.045	   0.160	   0.686	   0.477	   0.000	   0.250	  
Assessment/Planning	  Project	   0.955	   0.840	   0.314	   0.523	   1.000	   0.750	  
4.	  Intent	  of	  Threat	  
Non-­‐Malicious	   1.000	   1.000	   0.623	   0.827	   0.571	   0.645	  
Malicious	   0.000	   0.000	   0.377	   0.173	   0.429	   0.355	  
5.	  Level	  of	  Commitment	  
Personal	   1.000	   0.000	   0.000	   0.000	   1.000	   0.343	  
Impersonal	   0.000	   1.000	   1.000	   1.000	   0.000	   0.657	  
6.	  Investigative	  Skills	  	  
Passive	  Monitoring	   1.000	   0.000	   0.000	   1.000	   0.000	   0.624	  
Active	  Searching	   0.000	   1.000	   1.000	   0.000	   1.000	   0.376	  
 
 A person placed into Class 1 is four times more likely (0.798 vs. 0.202) to prefer 
investigating completed security threats compared to threats underway, and is twice as likely to 
consider the loss of an organization asset more harmful to an organization than a loss of 
reputation when a security event is discussed (0.685 vs. 0.315).  They consider threats accidental 
incidents and unintentional or irresponsible acts by employees to be far more important than 
malicious acts.  They do, however, take security personally and consider incidents an affront to 
  54 
their efforts.  They are, also, heavily reliant on security detection software to make them aware 
of security incidents.  A security professional placed into this class is considered to be a Passive 
Monitor. 
 Persons placed into Class 2 are 2.5 times more likely to prefer investigating security 
incidents after they are completed than while they are ongoing.  They consider the loss of 
corporate assets more damaging than loss of reputation, and over five times more likely to feel 
challenged while assessing network security or while developing security plans than the 
technical aspects of security.  They view security as simply a job in which they focus on non-
malicious threats while actively searching for incidents, as opposed to relying on software alerts.  
The person placed in Class 2 is an Active Planner. 
 Characteristics of the Class 3 security professional demonstrate a more technical 
approach to securing organizations.  These professionals actively search for security events that 
have occurred but are no longer in progress.  Furthermore, they are concerned with the reputation 
and integrity of their organization when a security threat has occurred, but they do not take the 
threats personally.   They are twice as likely to feel challenged by a technically oriented project 
like hardening a firewall or developing an intrusion detection algorithm.  A person placed in this 
class is a Manifest Technical Investigator. 
 Class 4 respondents take a more general, passive approach to security by exclusively 
monitoring alert software rather than actively searching the network for breaches.  They view 
their role as security professionals as simply a job, and view projects to assess and plan security 
as equally challenging to technical projects.  Those in this class prefer investigating completed 
security incidents four times more than ongoing events and consider the loss of reputation of an 
organization after a security incident as moderately more damaging than the loss of assets.  They 
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are more five times more likely to be motivated by investigating non-malicious incidents than 
malicious ones.  Thus, a security professional placed in this class is called Active Investigator. 
 Security professionals placed into Class 5 are the smallest of the classes in this study, 
primarily because they view many aspects of security as cut-and-dry as their item response 
probabilities imply.  They consider completed security incidents as the most challenging types of 
investigations; they consider the loss of organizational assets as the type of damage and event 
causes; and they prefer to assess and design security instead of develop algorithms or hard 
firewalls, for instance.  They consider both malicious and non-malicious events as equally 
threatening, as well as take threats against their network as a personal attack on their security 
efforts.  Finally, they actively search the network and logs for security incidents.  Given the 
clear-cut views on security, a security worker placed into Class 5 is an Active Investigator. 
 Class 6 is the largest class in the current study, boasting 173 of the 330 respondents.  
Those security professionals placed into this class are generalists and the most common type of 
security person.  Only one item-response probability is 100% and that involves the damage that a 
security event can have on the reputation of the organization for which they work.  The other 
item-responses demonstrate that they consider actively occurring threats important but, like all 
other classes, they consider investigating events that are over to be more appropriate to their 
skillset.  They are three times more likely to find an assessment project more challenging than a 
technical project, and they are almost twice as likely to consider non-malicious events a bigger 
threat to their network.  They take their work personally, but they mostly look at it as a job to 
perform.  Although actively monitoring the network through logs and other active mechanisms, 
they are more likely to rely on monitoring the security alert software.  Thus, a person placed into 
this largest class of information security workers is a General Protector. 
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 A six-class model emerged from the data that showed good absolute model fit and good 
relative fit using the BLRT; thus, H1 is supported.  Class 6, the General Protector, contains over 
half the observations, which indicates that more than half of the respondents answered the 
questions in a similar manner.  Thus, most of the respondents view security in much the same 
way.  Thus, H2 is supported. 
 With over 50% of security professionals possessing a General Protector view of 
information security, organizations are faced with the issue of securing their digital assets with a 
balance in security skills.  The following figure acts as a metaphor of the challenge introduced 
when such a large proportion of the staff views security issues in the same manner.  Possible 
holes are exposed in the spectrum of digital asset protection, even with minimal overlap in skills. 
 
Figure 5 – Security Coverage (Representative) 
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4.2.2	   Factor	  Analysis	  
 
 From the LCA, six classes emerged into which the information security respondents are 
placed.  The next step of the analysis is to determine whether the latent factors of Creativity, 
Trait Competitiveness, Deceptiveness, Distrust, and Morality predict membership in the classes.  
Prior to performing the multinomial logistic regression to test whether the latent factors predict 
class membership, it is necessary to perform factor analysis to ensure the factor model is correct.  
The survey questions all originated from existing instruments, which were shown to load 
adequately in the studies in which they were used.  However, it is important to confirm the 
loadings and fit of the measurement model prior to testing the structural model.   
 According to Hair Jr., Black, Babin, & Anderson (2010), the 𝜒! goodness of fit test with 
n>250 will lead to a significant result, which is the case with the measurement model resulting 
from the study’s factor analysis (p < 0.001).  However, Hair et al. (2010) suggests using two tests 
of model fit to more confidently assess the fit of the model (Hair et al., 2010).  Therefore, when 
the results of the confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) returned a significant 𝜒! p-value, the 
comparative fit index (CFI) and the root mean square error of approximation were not within the 
range suggested by Hair et al. (2010), it was necessary to address the badness of fit.   
 To address the issue with model fit using MPlus 7.2, the study relied on the advice given 
by Byrne (2012) to achieve an acceptable model fit.  This exercise, admittedly, moves the 
analysis from a confirmatory one to an exploratory one, but it is necessary due to factor loadings 
and cross-loading of latent predictors (indicators).  Using the modification indices section of the 
MPlus output, as suggested by Byrne (2012), the model was changed, based on the impact of the 
action suggested by the modification indices. Each action was taken one issue at a time with 
executions of MPlus between each change, the fit indices re-examined, and the modifications 
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reviewed before the next modification was performed.  Variables with the highest MI value in 
the residual covariance (WITH statement) section were addressed first, followed by the possible 
cross-loadings.  None of the suggested cross-loadings were added to the model.  Instead, the 
variable that had a possible cross-loading were removed.  Finally, variables that did not load on 
the factor at .5 or higher were removed.   
 Where the modification indices suggested freeing variance, in all cases, the reason was 
either a negatively worded item or an item that was worded similarly to another.  When an item 
did not have an adequate loading or loaded markedly different than the other factors, and the 
modification indices recommended removal to achieve better model fit, it was removed. 
 The resulting model’s 𝜒! p-value remained significant, but following the changes to the 
model, the CFI (0.924), the RMSEA (0.066), and the standardized root mean square residual 
(SRMR; 0.058) were at acceptable levels (Hair et al., 2010).  Table 6 contains the correlation 
matrix of the factor predictors. 
 Table 7 contains the factor loadings of the items on the latent factors representing the 
constructs in the analysis.  Hair et al. (2010) suggest a minimum factor loading of 0.5 with an 
optimal minimum of 0.7 loading on each factor.  The reliability of the factors was assessed with 
factor determinacy and using Cronbach’s alpha.  Muthen (2008) suggests using factor 
determinacy because Cronbach’s alpha “has to do with the correlation between the sum of items 
and a factor, where it is assumed that there is only 1 factor behind the items and the items have 
the same loadings and there are no residual correlations” (Muthen,   Discussion post February 
16, 2008).  The factor determinacy of all five factors exceeds the minimum of 0.8 (Muthen, 
2008).  All but one of the Cronbach’s alpha values exceeds to minimum value of 0.7, which 
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indicates reliability.  Cronbach’s alpha for Factor 4 (F4, Distrust) is lower than the required value 
of 0.7; however, the factor determinacy is significant.   
Table 6 – Correlation Matrix 
Correlation	  Matrix	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
Means	   CREZG001	   CREZG004	   CREZG005	   CREZG007	   CREZG008	   TCJA001	   TCJA002	   TCHS003	   TCBCS004	  
CREZG001	   5.600	   1.000	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  CREZG004	   5.506	   0.679	   1.000	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  CREZG005	   5.452	   0.644	   0.596	   1.000	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  CREZG007	   5.506	   0.597	   0.648	   0.682	   1.000	  
	   	   	   	   	  CREZG008	   5.752	   0.486	   0.468	   0.558	   0.708	   1.000	  
	   	   	   	  TCJA001	   5.073	   0.075	   0.064	   -­‐0.046	   0.038	   -­‐0.009	   1.000	  
	   	   	  TCJA002	   5.039	   0.152	   0.133	   0.033	   0.108	   0.112	   0.788	   1.000	  
	   	  TCHS003	   4.888	   0.209	   0.176	   0.119	   0.174	   0.240	   0.628	   0.698	   1.000	  
	  TCBCS004	   5.079	   0.105	   0.163	   0.000	   0.031	   0.043	   0.593	   0.562	   0.440	   1.000	  
DEVDAH01	   2.491	   -­‐0.170	   -­‐0.023	   -­‐0.124	   -­‐0.024	   -­‐0.138	   0.153	   0.152	   0.171	   0.162	  
DEVDAH02	   2.633	   -­‐0.184	   -­‐0.086	   -­‐0.167	   -­‐0.101	   -­‐0.180	   0.137	   0.114	   0.100	   0.132	  
DEVDAH03	   1.721	   -­‐0.210	   -­‐0.165	   -­‐0.219	   -­‐0.160	   -­‐0.217	   0.077	   0.086	   0.077	   0.077	  
DEVDAH04	   2.424	   -­‐0.181	   -­‐0.093	   -­‐0.139	   -­‐0.085	   -­‐0.184	   0.112	   0.128	   0.076	   0.152	  
DEVDAH05	   1.931	   -­‐0.252	   -­‐0.151	   -­‐0.160	   -­‐0.181	   -­‐0.231	   0.134	   0.136	   0.094	   0.158	  
DISTDAH1	   3.721	   0.030	   0.005	   -­‐0.094	   0.005	   0.016	   0.188	   0.183	   0.090	   0.087	  
DISTDAH2	   3.518	   -­‐0.181	   -­‐0.169	   -­‐0.224	   -­‐0.185	   -­‐0.192	   0.149	   0.169	   0.083	   0.208	  
DISTDAH3	   2.864	   -­‐0.103	   -­‐0.039	   -­‐0.179	   -­‐0.123	   -­‐0.078	   0.154	   0.152	   0.246	   0.261	  
MORIDI01	   5.879	   0.201	   0.124	   0.103	   0.160	   0.197	   0.080	   0.040	   0.052	   0.107	  
MORIDI02	   5.982	   0.297	   0.183	   0.079	   0.146	   0.143	   0.182	   0.142	   0.190	   0.256	  
MORIDI04	   5.776	   0.279	   0.163	   0.163	   0.238	   0.283	   -­‐0.025	   -­‐0.071	   -­‐0.002	   0.023	  
MORIDI05	   5.330	   0.108	   0.114	   -­‐0.013	   -­‐0.006	   0.067	   0.149	   0.058	   0.015	   0.157	  
 
	  Table	  6	  -­‐	  Correlation	  Matrix,	  Continued	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
DEVDAH01	   DEVDAH02	   DEVDAH03	   DEVDAH04	   DEVDAH05	   DISTDAH1	   DISTDAH2	   DISTDAH3	   MORIDI01	  
DEVDAH01	   1.000	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  DEVDAH02	   0.530	   1.000	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  DEVDAH03	   0.499	   0.518	   1.000	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  DEVDAH04	   0.690	   0.547	   0.510	   1.000	  
	   	   	   	   	  DEVDAH05	   0.436	   0.405	   0.656	   0.461	   1.000	  
	   	   	   	  DISTDAH1	   0.243	   0.356	   0.287	   0.257	   0.158	   1.000	  
	   	   	  DISTDAH2	   0.342	   0.295	   0.349	   0.259	   0.276	   0.221	   1.000	  
	   	  DISTDAH3	   0.209	   0.229	   0.289	   0.270	   0.303	   0.140	   0.282	   1.000	  
	  MORIDI01	   -­‐0.352	   -­‐0.366	   -­‐0.346	   -­‐0.413	   -­‐0.281	   -­‐0.109	   -­‐0.119	   -­‐0.130	   1.000	  
MORIDI02	   -­‐0.214	   -­‐0.287	   -­‐0.272	   -­‐0.248	   -­‐0.241	   -­‐0.033	   -­‐0.167	   -­‐0.032	   0.463	  
MORIDI04	   -­‐0.359	   -­‐0.383	   -­‐0.375	   -­‐0.384	   -­‐0.408	   -­‐0.146	   -­‐0.251	   -­‐0.120	   0.676	  
MORIDI05	   -­‐0.450	   -­‐0.284	   -­‐0.335	   -­‐0.440	   -­‐0.212	   -­‐0.077	   -­‐0.192	   -­‐0.135	   0.566	  
Table	  6	  -­‐	  Correlation	  Matrix,	  Continued	  
	   	   	   	  
	   MORIDI02	   MORIDI04	   MORIDI05	  
MORIDI02	   1.000	   	   	  
MORIDI04	   0.393	   1.000	   	  
MORIDI05	   0.392	   0.420	   1.000	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Table 7 – Factor Loadings and Reliability 
	   	   	   	   Reliability	  
	   	   	   	   Cronbach’s	   Factor	  
Factor	  Loadings	   Est.	   S.E.	   p-­‐value	   alpha	   Determinacy	  
F1	   CREZG001	   0.804	   0.026	   <	  0.001*	   0.884	   0.938	  
	  
CREZG004	   0.795	   0.026	   <	  0.001*	   	   	  
	  
CREZG005	   0.802	   0.026	   <	  0.001*	   	   	  
	  
CREZG007	   0.800	   0.026	   <	  0.001*	   	   	  
	  
CREZG008	   0.617	   0.040	   <	  0.001*	   	   	  
	   	   	   	  
	   	   	  
F2	   TCJA001	   0.874	   0.019	   <	  0.001*	   0.866	   0.952	  
	  
TCJA002	   0.900	   0.017	   <	  0.001*	   	   	  
	  
TCHS003	   0.746	   0.028	   <	  0.001*	   	   	  
	  
TCBCS004	   0.647	   0.035	   <	  0.001*	   	   	  
	   	   	   	  
	   	   	  
F3	   DEVDAH01	   0.723	   0.035	   <	  0.001*	   0.842	   0.917	  
	  
DEVDAH02	   0.722	   0.033	   <	  0.001*	   	   	  
	  
DEVDAH03	   0.709	   0.035	   <	  0.001*	   	   	  
	  
DEVDAH04	   0.744	   0.033	   <	  0.001*	   	   	  
	  
DEVDAH05	   0.576	   0.044	   <	  0.001*	   	   	  
	   	   	   	  
	   	   	  
F4	   DISTDAH1	   0.422	   0.058	   <	  0.001*	   0.449	   0.854	  
	  
DISTDAH2	   0.537	   0.060	   <	  0.001*	   	   	  
	  
DISTDAH3	   0.452	   0.058	   <	  0.001*	   	   	  
	   	   	   	  
	   	   	  
F5	   MORIDI01	   0.775	   0.036	   <	  0.001*	   0.785	   0.894	  
	  
MORIDI02	   0.586	   0.044	   <	  0.001*	   	   	  
	  
MORIDI04	   0.650	   0.045	   <	  0.001*	   	   	  
	  
MORIDI05	   0.710	   0.039	   <	  0.001*	   	   	  
	   	   *Significant	  at	  the	  𝛼 = 0.05	  
 
4.2.3	   Multinomial	  Logistic	  Regression	  
 
 The LCA performed determined most likely class membership for each observation using 
the six class indicators described in the Latent Class Analysis section, above.  Asparouhov & 
Muthen (2013) demonstrate a 3-step method of determining class membership and then using a 
multinomial logistic regression procedure to regress the most likely class on covariates.  The 
authors present both an automatic and manual method for performing this analysis (Asparouhov 
& Bengt, 2013).  The automatic method can only be performed on observed auxiliary variables, 
or covariates.   A more processing intensive, manual process is an option when latent factors are 
involved; however, the 3-step process is only suggested when entropy “goes much lower than 
0.8” (B. O. Muthén, November 21, 2008 - 7:53am).  The 6-class model chosen has an entropy 
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value of 0.785, which is sufficiently close to 0.8 to use the most-likely class approach to the 
multinomial logistic regression (Muthen, n.d.). 
 A multinomial logistic regression was performed by regressing the most-likely class of 
information security professional on latent factors representing Creativity, Trait 
Competitiveness, Deceptiveness, Distrust, and Morality while controlling for Age, Education, 
and Sex.  Table 8 shows the results of a univariable multinomial logistic regression for each 
factor and control variable in the model.  In the initial model-building stage of multinomial 
logistic regression, variables remain in the model at the 𝛼 = 0.25 level (Hosmer et al., 2013).  
Therefore, all factors and control variables remain in the model following the univariable, 
model-building step.   
 
Table 8 – Results of Univariable Multinomial Logistic Regression 
 
Wald 𝝌𝟐 d.f p-value 
Creativity 15.596 5 0.008* 
Competitiveness 9.526 5 0.088** 
Deceptiveness 32.264 5 < 0.001* 
Distrust 34.715 5 < 0.001* 
Morality 15.652 5 0.008* 
Sex 9.439 5 0.093** 
Age Range 10.991 5 0.052** 
Education 13.585 5 0.019* 
*Significant	  at	  the	  𝛼 = 0.05	  
**Significant	  at	  the	  𝛼 = 0.10 
 
 After determining that all factors should remain in the model, the most-likely class was 
regressed on all variables to further solidify model fit.  Upon review of the initial results, a large 
odds ratio with an exceptionally “wide” odds ratio confidence interval was detected, which 
indicated a possible multicolinearity issue involving Deceptiveness (B. O. Muthén & Muthén, 
n.d.).  Therefore, by regressing the latent factor representing Deceptiveness on all other 
predictors, the analysis indicated an 𝑅!value of 0.871, which leads to a tolerance value of 0.129.  
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Tolerance less than 0.2 indicates multicolinearity (Hair et al., 2010).  Therefore, Deceptiveness 
was removed from the model, which results in no support for H5. 
 With Deceptiveness removed, the most-likely class was regressed on the remaining four 
factors and the control variables.  Although the only significant p-values involving the control 
variables were seen in the logit of Class 6 vs. Class 3, it was determined to leave Age Range, 
Sex, & Education in the model throughout the analysis to control for these variables in the 
analysis.  Also, some of the other factors were found to be non-significant for several of the 
logits, as can be seen in Table 9, which led to performing likelihood ratio tests to determine the 
inclusion of each of the remaining factors. 
 
Table 9 – Multinomial Logistic Regression for Model Building, STD Output 
Table 9 
Logit Variable Coeff. S.E. p-value 
Odds 
Ratio Odds Ratio 95% CI 
Class 1 vs 
Class 6 F1 - Creativity 0.064 0.365 0.861 1.054 0.643 1.727 
 
F2 - Trait Competitiveness 0.908 0.474 0.055 2.067 1.116 3.828 
 
F4 - Distrust -0.742 0.609 0.223 0.247 0.038 1.622 
 
F5 - Morality -0.764 0.563 0.175 0.460 0.183 1.156 
 
Education 0.911 0.435 0.036 2.488 1.216 5.092 
 
Age Range 0.241 0.224 0.283 1.272 0.880 1.840 
 
Sex -1.598 0.955 0.094 0.202 0.042 0.973 
 
Intercept -3.096 2.595 0.233    
Class 2 vs 
Class 6 F1 - Creativity 0.624 0.421 0.138 1.670 0.947 2.946 
 
F2 - Trait Competitiveness 1.234 0.463 0.008 2.683 1.477 4.872 
 
F4 - Distrust -0.841 0.643 0.191 0.205 0.032 1.330 
 
F5 - Morality -0.713 0.545 0.191 0.484 0.194 1.210 
 
Education 0.809 0.372 0.030 2.245 1.217 4.139 
 
Age Range 0.308 0.231 0.182 1.360 0.931 1.988 
 
Sex -1.596 1.055 0.130 0.203 0.036 1.149 
 
Intercept -2.865 2.111 0.175    
Class 3 vs 
Class 6 F1 - Creativity 1.277 0.442 0.004 2.857 1.587 5.145 
 
F2 - Trait Competitiveness 1.016 0.442 0.022 2.254 1.267 4.009 
 
F4 - Distrust -0.319 0.539 0.554 0.548 0.105 2.874 
 
F5 - Morality -1.453 0.567 0.010 0.228 0.088 0.588 
 
Education 0.610 0.365 0.095 1.841 1.009 3.358 
 
Age Range 0.291 0.216 0.178 1.337 0.938 1.908 
 
Sex 0.068 0.916 0.941 1.070 0.237 4.831 
 
Intercept -4.315 1.916 0.024    
Class 4 vs 
Class 6 F1 - Creativity 0.659 0.355 0.063 1.719 1.060 2.787 
 
F2 - Trait Competitiveness 0.857 0.434 0.048 1.985 1.130 3.488 
 
F4 - Distrust -0.191 0.493 0.699 0.698 0.153 3.175 
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Table 9 
Logit Variable Coeff. S.E. p-value 
Odds 
Ratio Odds Ratio 95% CI 
 
F5 - Morality -1.281 0.532 0.016 0.272 0.114 0.645 
 
Education 0.415 0.349 0.235 1.514 0.852 2.689 
 
Age Range 0.393 0.215 0.067 1.482 1.041 2.110 
 
Sex -0.440 0.876 0.615 0.644 0.152 2.722 
 
Intercept -2.576 1.793 0.151    
Class 5 vs 
Class 6 F1 - Creativity 0.404 0.319 0.206 1.394 0.908 2.139 
 
F2 - Trait Competitiveness 0.962 0.401 0.017 2.158 1.271 3.663 
 
F4 - Distrust -0.185 0.441 0.674 0.705 0.183 2.717 
 
F5 - Morality -0.967 0.483 0.045 0.374 0.166 0.842 
 
Education 0.656 0.339 0.053 1.926 1.102 3.366 
 
Age Range 0.318 0.203 0.117 1.374 0.984 1.919 
 
Sex -0.883 0.836 0.291 0.414 0.104 1.637 
 
Intercept -0.935 1.630 0.566    
 
 
 Upon review of the results presented in Table 9, further investigation was warranted into 
the latent factors.  By performing a likelihood ratio test for each variable against the model 
presented in Table 9, the factors to retain in the model were determined.   
 Comparison of loglikelihoods reported in the MPlus output between the baseline model 
and each nested model (setting the parameter of the factor of interest to zero) to which it was 
compared is not recommended when the maximum likelihood with robust errors (MLR) 
estimator is used in MPlus (B. O. Muthén & Muthén, n.d.).  Instead, the following chi-square 
difference test is recommended: 
 𝑐𝑑 = 𝑑! ∗ 𝑐! − 𝑑! ∗ 𝑐!𝑑! − 𝑑!  
 
 𝜒!  𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 =   −2 ∗ 𝑇! − 𝑇!𝑐𝑑  
 
 
where cd is the scaling correction, d represents the degrees of freedom, c is the scaling correction 
factor, and T is the 𝜒! values for the nested and comparison models. 
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 Table 10 shows the results of the multivariable 𝜒!𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 test on each factor and 
control variable.  Additionally, a Wald test of each variable showed results consistent with the 𝜒!𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 tests reported in Table 10.  The results of the tests reported in Table 10 show that 
Distrust is not significant.  Therefore, Distrust was removed from the model for all subsequent 
analyses.  The decision to remove Distrust is also consistent with its less-than-desirable 
Cronbach’s alpha value, as reported earlier in Table 7.  Thus, there is no support for H3. 
Table 10 – Multivariable 𝝌𝟐𝑫𝒊𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 Tests 
 
 
Base 
Loglikelihood 
(L1) -8673.836  
     
 
c1 1.3093  
     
 
p1 103  
              
 
L0 c0 p0 cd 𝝌𝟐𝑫𝒊𝒇𝒇 d.f. p-value Decision for Variable 
Creativity -8637.92 1.2829 104 0.36076 36.8001 5 < 0.001* Keep 
Trait 
Competitiveness -8633.732 1.2732 104 0.56252 8.7108 5 0.121 
Keep per (Hosmer et 
al., 2013) 
Distrust -8632.253 1.2851 104 0.315 6.1651 5 0.291 Remove Distrust 
Morality -8634.636 1.2854 104 0.30876 21.7256 5 0.001* Keep 
Education -8635.302 1.2671 104 0.6894 11.6623 5 0.040* Keep 
Age Range -8634.187 1.2514 104 1.01596 5.7187 5 0.335 
Keep as control 
variable 
Sex -8638.901 1.2684 104 0.66236 23.0056 5 < 0.001* Keep 
*Significant	  at	  the	  𝛼 = 0.05	  
**Significant	  at	  the	  𝛼 = 0.10 
 
 The final model is presented in Table 11 and includes the factors: Creativity, Trait 
Competitiveness, & Morality and the control variables Education, Age Range, & Sex.  Age 
Range is a control variable and was kept in the model even though it was not significant in the χ!Difference test.  Age range is coded as an ordinal number representing the age range, in 
increments of 5 years beginning at 21 to 25 and ending at 70+, selected by the respondent.  In the 
analysis, the ordinal Age Range variable is treated as continuous due to the significant number of 
parameters estimated in the model. 
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Table 11 – Multinomial Logistic Regression Results for Final Model 
Table 11 
Logit Variable Coeff. S.E. p-value 
Odds 
Ratio 95% CI 
Class 1 vs 
Class 6 F1 - Creativity -0.187 0.302 0.535 0.858 0.572 1.286 
 
F2 - Trait Competitiveness -0.286 0.209 0.170 0.796 0.603 1.051 
 
F5 - Morality 0.385 0.342 0.260 1.461 0.823 2.594 
 
Education 0.282 0.276 0.307 1.325 0.842 2.086 
 
Age Range -0.064 0.105 0.539 0.938 0.789 1.114 
 
Sex -0.740 0.552 0.180 0.477 0.193 1.182 
 
Intercept -2.143 2.166 0.322    
Class 2 vs 
Class 6 F1 - Creativity 0.366 0.263 0.164 1.350 0.946 1.927 
 
F2 - Trait Competitiveness -0.003 0.216 0.990 0.998 0.751 1.325 
 
F5 - Morality 0.540 0.262 0.039 1.702 1.120 2.586 
 
Education 0.194 0.165 0.239 1.214 0.926 1.592 
 
Age Range 0.005 0.102 0.962 1.005 0.849 1.189 
 
Sex -0.793 0.659 0.229 0.453 0.153 1.338 
 
Intercept -1.742 1.373 0.204    
Class 3 vs 
Class 6 F1 - Creativity 0.906 0.305 0.003 2.101 1.392 3.173 
 
F2 - Trait Competitiveness -0.014 0.193 0.940 0.989 0.768 1.273 
 
F5 - Morality -0.433 0.247 0.079 0.653 0.439 0.971 
 
Education -0.033 0.170 0.846 0.967 0.731 1.280 
 
Age Range -0.024 0.078 0.762 0.977 0.860 1.110 
 
Sex 0.923 0.428 0.031 2.516 1.244 5.089 
 
Intercept -3.317 1.250 0.008    
Class 4 vs 
Class 6 F1 - Creativity 0.254 0.211 0.230 1.231 0.922 1.644 
 
F2 - Trait Competitiveness -0.106 0.170 0.533 0.919 0.733 1.151 
 
F5 - Morality -0.319 0.222 0.152 0.731 0.517 1.033 
 
Education -0.240 0.154 0.120 0.787 0.610 1.014 
 
Age Range 0.077 0.077 0.323 1.080 0.950 1.226 
 
Sex 0.443 0.383 0.247 1.558 0.830 2.923 
 
Intercept -1.643 1.013 0.105    
Class 5 vs 
Class 6 F1 - Creativity -0.461 0.298 0.122 0.685 0.463 1.015 
 
F2 - Trait Competitiveness -0.893 0.336 0.008 0.491 0.316 0.763 
 
F5 - Morality 0.935 0.522 0.073 2.511 1.092 5.777 
 
Education -0.672 0.340 0.048 0.511 0.292 0.894 
 
Age Range -0.319 0.200 0.112 0.727 0.523 1.011 
 
Sex 0.871 0.824 0.290 2.390 0.616 9.269 
 
Intercept 0.880 1.913 0.645    
 
 
 
Table 10 shows that each of the characteristics, taken individually, can be used to predict 
class membership.  Creativity, Deceptiveness, Distrust, and Morality predict class membership at 
a 95% confidence level and Trait Competitiveness predicts class membership at a 90% 
confidence level, from Table 10, when assessed individually.  Deceptiveness was removed 
because its inclusion created problems of multicolinearity, and Distrust was removed, because it 
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was not predictive when considered with the other variables in the model.  This leaves 
Competitiveness, Trait Competitiveness, and Morality as predictors of class membership.  Figure 
6 shows the final research model containing Creativity, Trait Competitiveness, and Morality after 
Deceptiveness and Distrust have been removed as a result of the model building process.  The 
multinomial logistic regression assesses the predictors’ ability to influence class membership 
when comparing each class to a reference class.   
 
Figure 6 – Final Model 
One of the six classes identified in the LCA must become the reference class (Hair et al., 
2010; Hosmer et al., 2013; Menard, 2010; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013).  The largest class has 173 
of the 330 observations, which seems to follow the earlier discussion about information security 
in organizations being staffed, primarily, with people who think similarly in their approach to 
security.  The reference category for the multinomial logistic regression was the sixth and largest 
class and each of the five logits assesses the predictor variables’ significance relative to the 
reference category (Menard, 2010).   
When reviewing the logit comparing observations placed into Class 1 to observations 
placed into Class 6, none of the predictor variables are significant.  Therefore, none of the 
variables in the model predict Class 1 membership.  In the logit comparing membership in Class 
Trait 
Competitiveness
Information 
Systems Security 
Classification
Creativity
Morality
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2 to membership in Class 6, only Morality is significant (𝛼 = 0.05).  A significant predictor 
variable indicates that when Morality increases by one standard deviation, the odds of being 
classified into Class 2 is 1.7 times more likely than being classified into Class 6.  The other 
characteristics are not significant, and no reliable information, other than Morality, can be used 
to predict Class 2 membership from the data used in this study.  Creativity was significant 
(𝛼 = 0.05) as was Morality (𝛼 = 0.10) in the comparison between Class 3 and Class 6.  For a 
one standard deviation increase in Creativity, the odds of being in Class 3 relative to Class 6 are 
2.1-fold and are significant (𝛼 = 0.05).  Additionally, Morality is significant (𝛼 = 0.10); so, for 
one standard deviation increase in Morality, odds of being in Class 3 are 0.65 times those of 
being in Class 6.  The only other variable used to predict class membership that was significant 
was the control variable, Sex.  All other variables used to predict membership in Class 3 relative 
to Class 6 were not significant. 
Like the logit comparing Class 1 to Class 6, there were no significant predictors in the 
logit comparing Class 4 to Class 6.   Given that the variables remaining in the model have been 
shown to be significant in predicting class membership, it is entirely likely that using a different 
reference class would yield a logit containing significant predictors; however, that is not of 
interest to this study.  The logit comparing Class 5 to Class 6 indicates three variables that are 
significant in predicting class membership, Trait Competitiveness (𝛼 = 0.05), Morality 
(𝛼 = 0.10), and Education (𝛼 = 0.05).  Education is used in this study as a control variable; so 
only Trait Competitiveness and Morality are of interest to this study.  A person with a one 
standard deviation higher measure of Trait Competitiveness is almost half as likely (0.49) to be 
in Class 5 than in Class 6.  A person with a one standard deviation higher measure of Morality is 
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2.5 more likely to be in Class 5 than in Class 6.  Creativity is not significant as a predictor of 
membership in Class 5 when compared to Class 6. 
 
Figure 7 – Estimated Probability of Class Membership based on Creativity 
Note: All values, other than Creativity, held to 0 
 
Figures 7, 8, & 9 tell an interesting story about the influence of each of the factors by 
demonstrating the impact of the factor on membership in each of the classes.  The images 
seem to imply that each class has a dominant characteristic that drives respondents into these 
classes.  For instance, Figure 7 shows that, a one standard deviation decrease in Creativity 
increases the probability of membership in Class 5.  Whereas, after a two standard deviation 
increase in Creativity, a respondent has a higher probability of being placed in the General 
Protector (Class 6) group. 
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Note: All values, other than Trait Competitiveness, held to 0 
 
Figure 8 – Estimated Probability of Class Membership based on Trait Competitiveness 
 
 Figure 8 shows that as Trait Competitiveness decreases by one standard deviation, the 
probability of membership in Class 5 compared to Class 6 increases, and continues to increase 
through a second decrease in standard deviation.  Figure 9 paints a different picture when 
assessing class membership as Morality decreases one standard deviation.  After a one standard 
deviation decrease in Morality, when compared to Class 6, the higher probability of membership 
changes from Class 5 to Class 6.   
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Note: All values, other than Morality, held to 0 
Figure 9 – Estimated Probability of Class Membership based on Morality 
0%	  10%	  
20%	  30%	  
40%	  50%	  
60%	  70%	  
80%	  90%	  
100%	  
-­‐2	   -­‐1	   0	   1	   2	   3	  
Pr
ob
ab
ilt
y	  
Morality	  -­‐	  Std	  Dev	  Change	  
Estimated	  Probability	  of	  Class	  Membership,	  Based	  
on	  Morality	  
Class	  1	  (6.4%)	  Class	  2	  (7.6%)	  Class	  3	  (12.7%)	  Class	  4	  (16.7%)	  Class	  5	  (4.2%)	  Class	  6	  (52.4%)	  
  71 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
 As described earlier, Social Identity theory suggests that people tend to congregate into 
groups where the members are similar to themselves (Ashforth & Mael, 1989).  The members of 
an in-group tend to seek homogeneity in many aspects of their professional lives.  The results of 
this study seem to bear this out.  Over half of the respondents to the survey used in this study 
were classified into one class.  The overwhelming similarity of the majority of the respondents to 
this survey seems to indicate the homogeneity of workers in the information security field.   
 Latent Class Analysis (LCA) is a useful technique for classifying the respondents and 
using those classes to determine the predictive ability of the five personality characteristics on 
class membership.  The skewed distribution toward Class 6 demonstrates an issue in the current 
method of staffing information security organizations.  Like social identity theory suggests, 
people gravitate toward homogeneity; however, in a role as important as information security, 
doing so puts the organization at risk. A better solution is to identify information security 
workers who are best equipped to mitigate the risk to an organization.  Rather than identifying 
one primary class of security expert, as this study indicates, an organization should staff the 
group that is charged with protecting its valuable digital assets in a manner that more evenly 
distributes the varying specialties across the security organization.  This study is an important 
step toward helping organizations to move in the direction and to stop protecting only the most 
obvious of attack paths. 
 The many challenges found in information systems security is captured in the ETSI 
Information Security Indicator.  This event model captures the breadth of knowledge a person 
  72 
tasked to protect an organization’s digital assets must possess (Rennock & Gaudin, 2013).  With 
entries ranging from intrusions and externals attacks to malfunctions, internal deviant behavior 
and hardware/software vulnerabilities, the indicators cover a broad spectrum of scenarios that a 
typical information security professional must be well versed in and prepared to investigate an 
attack or mitigate as risk.   
 For this reason, this study used the ETSI ITI Taxonomy as a basis upon which to develop 
questions to classify the types of information security professional.  The questions asked of 
security professionals were designed to tap the mindsets used in everyday security tasks within a 
variety of organizations.  Because of the diversity of the tasks security experts are expected to 
perform, this study is important because it helps not only to understand the mindsets and types of 
security experts that are needed to fully protect an organization, but it takes a very important step 
in understanding the characteristics they should possess.   
 The results of the LCA were not surprising in some respects and telling in other respects.  
One surprising finding was that, although all groups were split between non-malicious and 
malicious threats as the most preferred type of threat to address, that in all classes, non-malicious 
was found to be most preferred.  One view could be consistent with old I.T. adage, “once you 
feel you have your systems ‘idiot proof,’ the world seems to make a better idiot.”   Albeit a bit 
extreme, the statement does support the finding that protecting an organization’s digital assets 
from accidents ranging from natural disasters, power failures, and the inevitable hard drive 
failure to inadvertent impact by an employee can be sufficiently challenging.  Further, it may 
indicate that most organizations consider systems administrators their information security 
teams, which is not uncommon in mid-sized to some larger organizations.  By splitting their time 
between managing the health and well-being of existing servers, implementing new servers, 
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other general systems administration tasks, and granting internal security access, they simply are 
unable to pay additional attention to the range of internal and external security issues that a full-
time security professional would. 
 A large group of similarly oriented information security workers in one class was not 
unexpected, nor was it a shock to find that this group was more general in its views on 
information security.  Although the item-response probabilities were not split directly down the 
middle on most categories, the fact that they were divided in five of the six questions for Class 6 
demonstrates that the larger group of information security workers must be generalists.  It also 
points to the possibility that the members of this class have been forced to become jacks-of-all-
trades.  There is certainly no data in the study to assert that members of this class of security 
workers are not good at protecting organizations from the multitude of threats, on the contrary, 
the study seems to indicate that the generalists should be fortified with specialists to help protect 
the weaker areas of the perimeters of their organization – the fringes.   
 The other five classes identify various mindsets of security workers that are quite 
different from the General Protectors of Class 6.  The respondents in Class 1, for example, 
consider an assessment/planning project more interesting than a technically oriented one.  
Further, they prefer waiting for security software to alert them to a threat rather than proactively 
protecting their network.  Only a small percentage of the respondents were classified into this, 
Passive Monitors, class of information security professional.  Another class that contained a 
small number of respondents was Class 2, the Active Assessors.  The members of this class were 
a paradox as information security workers.  Their investigation skills were best used actively 
investigating system logs and server file systems to investigate a threat, but these experts 
preferred to assess security and offer plans to strengthen an organization’s security profile.  
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Actively monitoring system logs suggests a more technical approach but assessing and planning 
implies less hands-on work.  Like Class 1, Class 2 is relatively small (25). 
 Classes 3, 4, & 5 are larger and demonstrate more expected characteristics than Classes 1 
& 2.  Class 3 members are clearly technical experts, based on the response patterns of members.  
Classes 3 & 4 prefer technical projects to assessments and planning, but Class 4 members are 
split almost 50-50 (48%-52%) on technical vs. assessment.  Class 5 contains a very small but 
seemingly committed group of security workers.  With only 14 respondents placed into Class 5, 
they are the smallest of the classes but the only item in the list of questions that they were not 
100% on their chosen response to the binary question was the question assessing whether the 
respondent considered malicious or non-malicious threats a more serious threat to an 
organization.  There were split 57% to 43% in favor of non-malicious.  This is, likely, the group 
that would be more likely to investigate or stop an external hacker.  Further, Figure 6 shows that 
just over one unit of an additional measure of morality compared to Class 6 increases the 
probability a security professional would be placed into Class 5.  Therefore, it may be beneficial 
to assess potential security worker’s personality characteristic, because Class 5 respondents 
likely see hacking as morally wrong, and would work to prevent external threats that seem to 
have such large, publicly reported impacts on organizations. 
 As Table 12 indicates, the data contains a classification of six measurable classes with of 
security experts helpful to solidify an organization’s security efforts, which supports Hypothesis 
1.  As reported in the results of the data analysis, the entropy, a measure of class separation, 
indicated a good separation among classes.  This indicates that the clusters for even the smaller 
classes were well defined.   Class 6, the largest class, suggests a generalist approach, which 
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supports Hypothesis 2 positing the existence of an in-group approach to staffing information 
security departments. 
Table 12 - Hypotheses, Assessment, and Support 
 Hypothesis Method of Assessment Findings 
H1 Information Systems Security professionals can be 
categorized into classes ranging from passively-
oriented (reactive) to aggressively-oriented 
(proactive) mindsets toward information systems 
security 
Latent Class Analysis Supported 
H2 One class of the types of will be significantly larger 
than other types 
Latent Class Analysis Supported 
H3 Creativity will predict class membership Multinomial Logistic 
Regression 
Supported 
H4 Trait Competitiveness will predict class membership Multinomial Logistic 
Regression 
Supported 
H5 Deceptiveness will predict class membership Multinomial Logistic 
Regression 
Not Supported 
H6 Distrust will predict class membership Multinomial Logistic 
Regression 
Not Supported 
H7 Morality will predict class membership Multinomial Logistic 
Regression 
Supported 
 
Figure 4 shows the probability of class membership of creativity with each one-unit 
(standard deviation) increase of Creativity relative to the level of creativeness of the members of 
Class 6.  From this visualization of the data, as information security professionals are identified 
with greater levels of creativity, probability of placement into Class 3 increases significantly.  
However, with a one standard deviation change less creativity, the probability of class 
membership in Class 5 increases, and the probability of membership in Class 5 increases even 
more with a two standard deviation decrease.  Thus, there is support for Hypothesis 3.  A 
member of Class 3, as discussed previously, has a higher probability of favoring investigative 
work after a security threat is complete than members of all but members of Class 5.  The label 
given to Class 3 is Manifest Technical Investigator.  Members of this class of security expert are 
concerned about the organization’s reputation, whose digital assets security experts protect, in a 
security incident.  Most notably, however, the Manifest Technical Investigator considers 
technical ability the foremost skill as a security expert.  This is in line with high levels of 
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creativity relative to investigating and preventing security incidents.  For instance, intrusion 
detection algorithms and related systems have sophisticated software and hardware to detect and 
subsequently prevent a breach of the system.  Professionals with high levels of creativity are 
essential in developing and supporting this type of activity.  Finally, Manifest Technical 
Investigators favor searching through the detailed logs and other internals of networks and 
computer systems when performing an investigation rather than relying upon monitoring alerts to 
inform them of an issue.  This clear indication of technical ability and prowess separates their 
creativity from other security experts. 
Table 13 – Summary of Information Security Mindsets (Classifications) 
 
Mindset Name 
#  of 
Respondent
s in Class 
(n=330) 
%	  of	  
Total	  
Influencing 
Characteristic 
Relative to 
Reference Class 
(Class 6)	   Security Mindset Description 
1 Passive Monitor 21 6.36%	   	   Damage due to lost assets of greater value 
than loss of reputation, prefers planning 
over technical investigations, and responds 
to alerts instead of seeking breach 
evidence. 
2 Active Planner 25 7.58	   Creativity	   Guards assets rather than org. reputation, 
plans security projects, and prefers to 
search for security issues instead of waiting 
for software to alert. 
3 Manifest Technical 
Investigator 
42 12.73	   Creativity	   Security is to guard reputation of 
organization.  Seeks to technically 
investigate incidents, and actively searches 
for breaches. 
4 General Monitor 55 16.67	   Morality	   Monitors alerts over actively searching for 
breaches, views loss of assets and 
reputation of equal value, as well as seeks 
challenging technical and assessment 
projects. 
5 Active Investigator 14 4.24	   Creativity	  Trait	  Competitiveness	  Morality	   Loss of asset far outweighs loss of reputation to organization, takes breaches personally, and actively searches for cause 
of incident. 
6 General Protector 173 52.42	   Creativity	  Trait	  Competitiveness	  Morality	   Loss of reputation because of an incident is of utmost importance, does not take incidents personally, and prefers alert 
monitoring more than searching for 
incidents that have occurred.  	   	   330	   100.00%	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Figure 5 contains a similar graph, but the focus of this graph is Trait Competitiveness.  
This graph does not single out a characteristic quite as dramatically, but it does show that 
competitiveness is a key indicator of the factors influencing membership in Class 6, the General 
Protectors. With slightly more than a one standard deviation change in Trait Competitiveness, 
the probability of membership in Class 5 becomes the dominant classification.  Thus, Hypothesis 
4 is supported.  Although they are called General Protectors, the label in no way indicates less 
identification as a security expert.  General Protectors, like Manifest Technical Investigators, are 
concerned with an organization’s reputation in the event of a security incident, but General 
Protectors are more challenged by assessing and planning security and prefer to monitor software 
designed to alert security workers when an event is perceived to have occurred.  They assess and 
plan as their means to compete with those who would attempt to access or harm an 
organization’s digital access.  Like most other security-minded professionals, General Protectors 
are involved in the interactive decision theory and conflict analysis upon which game theory 
elaborates (Manshaei, Zhu, Alpcan, Basar, & Hubaux, 2013; Myerson, 1991; Shiva, Roy, & 
Dasgupta, 2010). Although the study does not explore competitiveness from a game theoretic 
perspective in this paper, the competitiveness of hackers and security experts alike is well 
documented (Manshaei et al., 2013; Matusitz, 2009; Shiva et al., 2010; Tang, Zhao, & Zhou, 
2011).  The interest of this study is in classifying and understanding the characteristics of the 
information security professional. 
Figure 6, like the others, shows a graph of a characteristic emerging in a manner that did 
not become evident in tabular form, such as the statistics presented earlier.  The difference 
between this graph and either of the others is that it clearly shows an immediate impact of 
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Morality on membership into Class 5 after less than one standard deviation change, compared to 
Class 6, which indicates support for Hypothesis 7. 
Early in the analysis, the issues with Deceptiveness became evident.  Therefore, 
Deceptiveness was removed from the model, indicating no support for Hypothesis 4.  
Additionally, Distrust was not significant as the model building process continued when 
comparing Classes 1 through 5 to Class 6; however, it was shown to be a significant predictor of 
class membership in Table 8 (Hosmer et al., 2013).  In multinomial logistic regression, a Wald 
test is performed to determine whether each variable is significant when comparing membership 
in a class compared to a reference class.  A variable may show a p-value of less than 0.05 when 
comparing Class 1 to a reference class such as Class 2, for example, but it may not show a 
significant result when comparing Class 1 to a reference class such as Class 4.  Since the purpose 
of this study was to determine membership in a class compared to Class 6 as the reference class, 
Distrust was removed from the model, but it may have been significant when comparing classes 
to a reference class other than Class 6.  This is identified, because Table 8 shows Distrust as a 
significant predictor, which may be evident when a different reference class is used in the 
logistic regression.  Because Distrust was removed from the model, even though it was shown to 
predict class membership, there was still no support for Hypothesis 6. 
Although the purpose of the research was not to find the precise balance of skills across 
the entire security organization, the study suggests that over fifty percent of respondents being 
General Protectors, although beneficial, may not provide the most diverse thinking regarding 
how to prevent and stop security incidents.  Furthermore, equal balance among all classes of 
security professional may not be the optimal mix for a security department.  As figures 4 through 
6 suggest, varying increases or decreases in Morality, Trait Competitiveness, and/or Creativity 
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may lead to a more balanced mix of security mindsets represented in the organization, as 
illustrated in Figure 10 and Figure 11. 
 
Figure 10 – Balanced Security Professional Classification (Illustrative) 
 
 
Figure 11 – Possible Balanced Security Coverage 
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5.1 Implications for Theory and Research 
 
 Determining the types of information security professionals advances the field of 
information security by providing the basis for the development of a more comprehensive 
taxonomy of information security activities.  Future research should be conducted to determine 
any additional classification of security types. 
 As with any personality-oriented research, the volume of characteristics available to 
study seems endless,  but this study chose five specific characteristics from literature suggesting 
characteristics of hackers. Instead of the Big Five or other popular comprehensive measures of 
personality, the study used sub-scales targeted at specific characteristics that could possibly help 
understand the relationship between hackers and those who are trying to stop them, in once 
sense.  Demonstrating the importance of Morality, Competitiveness, and Creativity in 
information security work is a basis upon which the discipline can build.   
 Another important finding is that the characteristics that help define a hacker do not 
necessarily define the information security professional; however, some of the characteristics are 
consistent.  Continuing this work to determine what leads a person to hack should continue (Xu 
et al., 2013).  From this understanding, members of the information security field must continue 
this work to attempt to understand what may influence a hacker to turn toward security as a 
career.  There is much anecdotal evidence of infamous hackers selling their abilities as 
consultants and to assist companies they formerly attacked; however, the information security 
field can greatly benefit by an extension of this research into the hacker community and then 
marrying the two research streams into one stream that attempts to understand and explain both 
sides, and the relationships among them, which may be two sides of the same coin. 
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 The methodology used in this study is unique in the information systems and security 
discipline.  Using Delphi to inform the selection of latent class indicators, as far as my research 
shows, has not been used.  Determining the questions to ask by tapping into a small group of 
industry experts and then using their guidance to develop question adapted from a established 
security taxonomy provided a high level of relevance to the latent class analysis.  Furthermore, 
with guidance from the management literature, the multinomial logistic regression method of 
determining class membership led to important probability information regarding the 
characteristics that will inform both the information systems discipline and practice.  Thus, the 
Delphi-driven latent class analysis method is a research approach that could be used through 
information system as a guide to person-oriented studies. 
 
Figure 12 - The Delphi-Driven Latent Class Analysis Method 
 
 As with other person-oriented studies, this study not only helps provide an understanding 
of the underpinnings of information security behavior, but its most obvious implications are to 
practitioners in the field. 
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5.2 Implications for Management 
 
 Both I.T. management and Information security management can use these findings to 
further strengthen their ability to make organizations more secure.  Identifying the classes of 
information security professionals is a very helpful finding, especially identifying and verifying 
the scenario that social identity theory has been suggesting in all aspects of human behavior for 
decades.  Information security departments are in no better position than other parts of an 
organization when the group’s thinking lacks diversity.  If information security professionals all 
think alike, however, the impact to the organization can be damaging.   External and internal 
threats can then, potentially, go undetected and an organization’s digital assets become 
vulnerable.  Simply knowing the risk of continuing the same practices that have allowed the field 
to skew the workforce in one particular direction can help management develop a plan to rectify 
the situation.  
 Fortunately, this study goes beyond merely identifying the classifications of information 
security workers.  Instead, the study shows the characteristics that can be measured in existing 
staff and in potential new hires to more successfully staff the organization to protect it on many 
fronts.  There is no doubt that an organization like Target, for instance, has the resources to hire a 
diverse group of information security workers.  The results of this study suggest that, because the 
respondents span 23 different industries, it is likely that it is generalizable to the retail industry, 
as well.  If so, then it is likely that many organizations’, Target included, information security 
organization may be homogenous, as this study suggests, and it could benefit from diversity in 
mindsets to protect the assets Target has to protect.  It is left to others to attempt to replicate 
these results to specific industries, like retail.   
  83 
 Because the study of specific characteristics is based in the literature that has attempted to 
identify the characteristics and motivation of hackers, the findings may begin the process of 
understanding ways in which to better prepare information security organizations to identify 
specific characteristics to help security workers think more like the people from whom they are 
trying to protect their organizations.  As game theory suggests, knowing an adversary and how 
he or she thinks helps one make better decisions (Myerson, 1991). 
 
5.3 Limitations 
 
 The study’s multinomial logistic regression estimated a very large number of parameter 
estimates that came very close to the limitation for accurate estimates.  The results may have 
been impacted by the sample size, because with all five factors in the model, convergence was 
sometimes an issue in the data analysis.  Although the univariable tests of each factor and control 
variable showed all variables were significant, all but Trait Competitiveness and Sex at the 𝛼 = 0.05 level and Trait Competitiveness and Sex at the 𝛼 = 0.10 level, when comparing Class 
6 to the other classes, Class 1 and Class 4 did not have any significant predictors.  New 
characteristics could be added to the model to discover the other predictors of class membership, 
but this would add to the parameters to be estimated and would exacerbate the sample size 
problem.  A larger sample, of course, would need to be acquired. 
 Similar to the problem predicting membership in Class 1 and Class 4, other predictors 
certainly contribute to prediction of class membership, but they were not identified in the 
literature and, thus, not include in the study.  Although no study can include every variable and 
explain all of the variance, this study was not as predictive as the researcher had expected. 
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5.4 Future Research 
 
 Information systems security professionals are on the front lines protecting an 
organization’s digital assets from threats, both internal and external; however, security workers 
are not solely responsible for an organizations security.  A number of studies have been 
performed to assess end-user views of security through social engineering studies (Chantler & 
Broadhurst, 2006; M. Gupta & Sharman, 2006; Huber, Kowalski, Nohlberg, & Tjoa, 2009; 
Lauinger, Pankakoski, Balzarotti, & Kirda, 2010; Workman, 2007).  However, little if any 
research has been performed to determine types of end users from the perspective of security.    
Also, software developers are responsible for writing software that is not susceptible to 
exploitation by external hackers, as well as secure from unintended use within an organization.  
A study of the various types of software developers, relatively to how they address secure code 
would have implications for hiring and training software developers for a secure organization.  It 
would, also, contribute to the information system body of knowledge by identifying tendencies 
of software developers that indicate potential lack of conscientiousness when developing 
forward-facing software containing sensitive corporate information. 
 An additional investigation with this study’s data would be interesting to determine 
whether Morality moderates the relationship between any of this study’s factors and class 
membership.  Other studies have viewed the moderating effect of morality and the face validity 
of Morality moderating the relationship between Competitiveness, for example, and the type of 
information security professional a person is valid.   Another study that may include the 
moderating and direct effects of Morality, using this study’s data, would involve developing a 
full structural equation model testing the relationships between all of the factors included in this 
study after determining relationships among the constructs contained in the literature. 
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 A related study may be to test the level of creativity demonstrated by I.T. professionals 
compared to the level of creativity in the general population.  This study may show that 
creativity of I.T. personnel is higher than the general population, which may explain why the 
probability of moving to another class with an increase in Creativity only occurs after a two 
standard deviation increase due to an already high level of creativity in I.T. 
 Finally, a related stream of research that could easily follow this study is to perform this 
study on a sample of hackers to determine whether, first, that the hackers could be placed in the 
same classifications.  Second, a study could determine whether empirical testing supports the 
literature showing that the five characteristics used in the current study that were reported to be 
characteristics of hackers truly were, when used in the same model. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
 This study identifies a significant trend in information security, which has gone mostly 
undetected from the time securing digital assets became an important part of an organization’s 
infrastructure.  True to the tenets of social identity theory, security organizations err when they 
staff in the manner they are currently hiring.  Information security organizations are charged with 
a nearly impossible task of protecting everything in their organization that is stored or 
transmitted digitally.  The studies showing characteristics of hackers and employees intent on 
doing harm to an organization, as discussed, exhibit the characteristics central to this study: 
creativity, competitiveness, deceptiveness, distrust, and morality at varying levels, which is why 
this study focused on these characteristics (Bachmann, 2010; Cavusoglu, Raghunathan, & Yue, 
2008; Holt, Bossler, & May, 2012; Jordan & Taylor, 1998; Xu et al., 2013).   
 Empirically studying these characteristics is a good starting point to help identify ways 
organizations can combat the same characteristics in the people they need to stop.  To this point, 
organizations have found ways to improve their defenses and stop the vast majority of attacks 
through more sophisticated software and improved training of existing staff.  However, 
identifying a well-rounded staff helps the security department better protect an organization and 
to anticipate attack vectors by both internal and external threats.  This only strengthens the 
organization and increases the impact of the security function of an IT organization.   
 By understanding and implementing the findings in this study, organizations can take a 
positive step toward a more secure organization.  Additionally, the study advances the 
information systems field by developing an understanding of the mindset of information systems 
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professionals.  This allows academics to develop solid theory and techniques to guide a more 
comprehensive information security subset of the information security discipline.   
 This study is a step toward developing a more thorough understanding of the intangible 
characteristics and skills the information security field must develop to effectively combat the 
growing threat from hackers and deviant internal employees.  Practitioners have anecdotal 
evidence of these characteristics and the behavior to which they lead, but the findings of this 
rigorous study involving empirical justification of why more diversity is needed in staffing 
security positions can lead to more secure organizations.  Additionally, understanding the 
characteristics for which to look when hiring not only helps identify the right person for the role, 
but can help a hiring manager optimize hiring decisions.
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  96 
A.1	   Information	  Security	  Classification	  	  
(Emphasis added to demonstrate coding) 
	   	   	  
In which of the following situations are you most effective? (completed security events coded 
0, events underway coded 1) 
1. A failed security event 
2. Security event attempt underway 
3. Security event succeeded 
  
When/if an incident occurs, which of the following consequences damages your 
organization the most? (loss of reputation coded 0, loss of asset coded 1)      
1.  Loss of confidentiality     
2.  Loss of integrity (defacement, financial fraud, etc.)  
3.  Loss of availability of the asset    
    
On which of the following information security projects do you prefer to work? (technical 
projects coded 0, assessment/planning project coded 1) 
1.  Risk assessment of your corporate network     
2.  Hardening your forward-facing firewalls     
3.  Training end-users in how to detect and avoid social engineering threats   
4.  Developing a digital asset risk management strategy    
5.  Developing an automated intrusion detection algorithm 
    
Which of the following presents the biggest threat to your network? (non-malicious event 
coded 0, malicious attack coded 1) 
1.  Accident (natural disaster, physical failure, software malfunction) 
2.  Unintentional act (i.e. error by internal employee/service provider) 
3.  Irresponsible/careless act by internal employee 
4.  Malicious act on a digital asset 
 
 
If a security event occurred in an area (network device, program, etc.) for which you were 
primarily responsible, would you consider this even an affront to your efforts to keep your 
organization safe from threats? 
0.  No.  “It’s just another day at the office.” 
1.  Yes.  “How dare someone break into my network!” 
 
Which of the following two scenarios would most stimulate your investigative skills? 
0.  Intrusion detection software issues an alert that a security event has been detected 
1.  You discover a security event on your network as you look through the server logs. 
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A.2	   Creativity	  Scale	  
 
Respondents are presented with the following instructions and respond on a 7-point Likert-like 
scale: 
 
Please use the rating scale below to indicate how accurately each statement describes you.  (1 – 
Very Inaccurate to 7 – Very Accurate) 
 
 
1 Suggest new ways to achieve goals and objectives 
2 Come up with practical ideas to improve security 
3 
Search out new technologies, processes, techniques, and/or 
product ideas. 
4 Suggest new ways to increase quality.  
5 Is a good source of creative ideas.  
6 Is not afraid to take risks. 
7 Promotes and champions ideas to others. 
8 Exhibits creativity on the job when given the opportunity to 
9 
Develops adequate plans and schedules for the 
implementation of new ideas 
10 Often has new and innovative ideas. 
11 Comes up with creative solutions to problems.  
12 Often has a fresh approach to problems. 
13 Suggests new ways of performing work tasks.  
 
(Zhang and Bartol, 2010; Zhou and George, 2001) 
 
A.3	   Trait	  Competitiveness	  Scale	  	  
 
Respondents are presented with the following instructions and respond on a 7-point Likert-like 
scale: 
 
Please use the rating scale below to indicate how accurately each statement describes you.  (1 – 
Very Inaccurate to 7 – Very Accurate) 
 
1. I am a competitive person 
2. I like to compete against others 
3. I enjoy working in situations involving competiton with others 
4. It is important to me to perform better than others on a task 
 
Jelinek and Ahearne (2010) 
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A.4	   Deceptiveness	  Scale	  
 
Respondents are presented with the following instructions and respond on a 7-point Likert-like 
scale: 
 
Please use the rating scale below to indicate how accurately each statement describes you.  (1 – 
Very Inaccurate to 7 – Very Accurate) 
 
1 
I believe that lying is necessary to maintain a competitive 
advantage over others. 
2 
The only good reason to talk to others is to get information 
that I can use to my benefit 
3 
I am willing to be unethical if I believe it will help me 
succeed 
4 
I am willing to sabotage the efforts of other people if they 
threaten my own goals 
5 I would cheat if there was a low chance of getting caught 
 
Dahling et al. (2008) 
A.5	   Distrust	  Scale	  
 
Respondents are presented with the following instructions and respond on a 7-point Likert-like 
scale: 
 
Please use the rating scale below to indicate how accurately each statement describes you.  (1 – 
Very Inaccurate to 7 – Very Accurate) 
 
1 People are only motivated by personal gain.  
2 I dislike committing to groups because I don’t trust others. 
3 Team members backstab each other all the time to get ahead.  
4 
If I show any weakness at work, other people will take advantage of 
it. 
5 
Other people are always planning ways to take advantage of the 
situation at my expense.  
 
Dahling et al. (2008) 
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A.6	   Morality	  Scale	  
 
Respondents are presented with the following instructions and respond on a 7-point Likert-like 
scale: 
 
Please use the rating scale below to indicate how accurately each statement describes you.  (1 – 
Very Inaccurate to 7 – Very Accurate) 
 
1 
It would make me feel good to be a person who has these 
characteristics. 
2 
Being someone who has these characteristics in an important 
part of who I am. 
3 
I would be ashamed to be a person who had these 
characteristics (Reverse coded) 
4 
Having these characteristics is not really important to me 
(Reverse coded) 
5 I strongly desire to have these characteristics. 
6 
I often wear clothes that identify me as having these 
characteristics 
7 
The types of things I do in my spare time (e.g. hobbies) 
clearly identify me as having these characteristics 
8 
The kinds of books and magazines that I read identify me as 
having these characteristics. 
9 
The fact that I have these characteristics is communicated to 
others by my membership in certain organizations. 
10 
I am actively involved in activities that communicate to 
others that I have these characteristics. 
 
(Aquino & Freeman, 2009; Aquino & Reed, 2002)
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APPENDIX B: DELPHI TABLES
  101 
B.1	   Delphi	  Rounds	  and	  Statistics	  
 
Round 1   
Participants contacted via e-mail 82 
Responses received 17 
E-mail undeliverable (bounced back) 4 
Out of office notification with now subsequent response 1 
Lecture about links in e-mail 1 
Responses to Delphi on Qualtrics 11 
Abandoned without answering Delphi question 1 
No e-mail address provided 1 
Usable respondents 9 
Questions received 32 
Unique questions 30 
Average questions per usable respondent 3.3 
Maximum questions from respondent 6 
Minimum questions from respondent 1 
Round 2  
Round 2 e-mails sent 9 
Rankings received 8 
Round 3  
Round 3 e-mails sent 8 
Round 3 re-rankings received 0 
Round 3 confirmations  8 
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B.2	   Delphi	  Questions	  from	  Experts	  
 
1. Do you understand security scoring such as the Common Vulnerability Scoring 
System (CVSS)? 
2. What Common Vulnerability & Exposure (CVE) alerts have you noticed recently 
that you would take action on right away? 
3. Describe what you would consider to be a mature security posture? 
4. Just how paranoid are you about the security threats facing my network? 
5. How will you add value to our Information Security team? 
6. What training and experience do you have in Information Security? 
7. What certifications do you hold? 
8. Why did you get into Information Security? 
9. What do you see as the biggest issue for information Security Professionals today? 
10. Describe your top accomplishments in Information Security 
11. What is the most secure endpoint computer (server or workstation) that can be had? 
12. Given a defined budget, what would be some things they would do to improve the 
company's Infosec posture? 
13. Describe what is meant by an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) 
14. Which country do you believe presents the most risks or threats to our country 
15. What is the biggest challenge you have faced in securing your past or current 
employer and how did you manage that challenge? 
16. Describe the technologies in which your consider yourself an expert 
17. In what technologies do you have a working understanding? 
18. Rate your written skills on a scale of 1 to 10 with 10 being highest/best? 
19. Rate your verbal skills on a scale of 1 to 10 with 10 being highest/best? 
20. Describe your work experiences dealing with various technologies and your degree 
of involvement in those projects. 
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B.3	   Delphi	  Final	  Ranking	  of	  Expert’s	  Questions	  
 
 
Average 
Ranking Question 
3.67 How will you add value to our Information Security team? 
4.000 Describe what you would consider to be a mature security posture? 
5.000 What training and experience do you have in Information Security? 
6.167 
What is the biggest challenge you have faced in securing your past or current employer 
and how did you manage that challenge? 
6.833 Describe your top accomplishments in Information Security 
7.167 What do you see as the biggest issue for information Security Professionals today? 
8.167 Why did you get into Information Security? 
8.333 What certifications do you hold? 
8.833 
Given a defined budget, what would be some things they would do to improve the 
company's Infosec posture? 
9.000 
Describe your work experiences dealing with various technologies and your degree of 
involvement in those projects. 
9.667 Just how paranoid are you about the security threats facing my network? 
9.833 Describe what is meant by an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) 
9.833 In what technologies do you have a working understanding? 
10.000 
Do you understand security scoring such as the Common Vulnerability Scoring System 
(CVSS)? 
10.167 
What Common Vulnerability & Exposure (CVE) alerts have you noticed recently that you 
would take action on right away? 
10.167 What is the most secure endpoint computer (server or workstation) that can be had? 
10.167 Which country do you believe presents the most risks or threats to our country 
10.167 Rate your verbal skills on a scale of 1 to 10 with 10 being highest/best? 
10.667 Describe the technologies in which your consider yourself an expert 
10.667 Rate your written skills on a scale of 1 to 10 with 10 being highest/best? 
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APPENDIX C: COMMUNICATION 
  105 
C.1	   Initial	  Delphi	  Participation	  E-­‐Mail	  
 
[Name Removed], 
 
My name is David Pumphrey, and I am a PhD student at the University of Mississippi conducting 
Information Systems Security (ISS) research for my dissertation.  As president of the [Chapter Name 
Removed] chapter of ISSA, you are clearly concerned with developments in Information Systems 
Security, and your expertise would be invaluable to research that will help us understand the human 
behavioral side of ISS.  I would appreciate it if you could spend ten minutes providing your 
expertise.  This study involves your responses in this first round and your assessment of your peers’ 
responses in two additional rounds.  I do not anticipate this, or either of the following two rounds, taking 
more than ten minutes of your time. 
If interested in participating, please paste the following URL into the address line of your preferred 
browser.  
 
http://uofmississippi.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_6zfUKV3Xfh37pQh&email=[e-mail address 
removed] 
 
Please note that the link includes your e-mail address so I know you have responded and can contact 
you for the two brief, remaining rounds of the study.  Upon accessing the questionnaire site, your e-mail 
address is presented for confirmation.  After receiving all responses, I will use this address or an 
alternative you specify to contact you again to provide feedback on the aggregated, anonymous list of 
responses.  Your e-mail is never provided to others and your responses remain completely anonymous to 
other participants. 
 
As a 23-year I.T. veteran, I know the demands on your time, but if it would help you assess my 
credibility prior to agreeing to participate, please feel free to call my personal mobile number at 662-816-
4927.  I would be happy to answer any questions you have about my asking for your participation. 
 
You will be providing the data upon which the research is built and I sincerely appreciate your 
assistant in this.  As this study unfolds, I will gladly provide you with the findings.  Simply let me know if 
you would like to be kept informed and I will do so. 
 
Sincerely, 
David Pumphrey 
Doctoral Candidate – Information Systems 
University of Mississippi 
 
This study has been reviewed by The University of Mississippi’s Institutional Review Board 
(IRB).  The IRB has determined that this study fulfills the human research subject protections obligations 
required by state and federal law and University policies.  If you have any questions, concerns, or reports 
regarding your rights as a participant of research, please contact the IRB at (662) 915-7482. 
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C.2	   Delphi	  Ranking	  E-­‐Mail	  
 
[Name], 
 
Thank you for your responses to our question regarding identifying effective information security 
professionals.  We have organized the responses from your information security expert peers into a list of 
responses.  The next step should take 10 minutes of your time to rank the questions we received. 
 
The URL below will open a list of responses we received and allow you to rank the questions you and 
your peers ask to determine the effectiveness of an information security job candidate.   Once the list 
opens, we ask that you rank the questions in order of importance in determining effective information 
security workers, with the questions at the top best identifying effectiveness and, at the bottom, questions 
you feel provide the least information to determine information security effectiveness. 
 
[URL to Qualtrics “survey” allowing ranking] 
 
Please provide your response by [date], and, again, this research is not possible without your input.  
So, please take a short time to assist in this research. 
 
This study has been reviewed by The University of Mississippi’s Institutional Review Board (IRB).  
The IRB has determined that this study fulfills the human research subject protections obligations 
required by state and federal law and University policies.  If you have any questions, concerns, or reports 
regarding your rights as a participant of research, please contact the IRB at (662) 915-7482. 
 
Thanks,  
David Pumphrey 
University of Mississippi 
Doctoral Candidate -  MIS 
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[Name Removed], 
 
I could really use your help with feedback from the [chapter name removed] area.  Please consider not deleting 
this follow-up to my initial request to help with my dissertation research on the characteristics of information 
systems security professionals.  I am a fellow I.T. colleague, and I was in your shoes prior to going back to school.  I 
worked in I.T. for over 23 years, and frankly, I deleted e-mails like this, too.  I had no idea the difficulty in 
collecting data from I.T. folks like us. 
 
I wanted to make one more appeal; so, please forgive the intrusion on your workday.  If you could help to 
provide real, expert data on which I can further my study, I would greatly appreciate it.  I am asking for the 
following: 
 
1. Open the URL below to help me gather critical information for the first step of my research.  It includes 
this e-mail address so I can perform steps (4) & (5) below. 
2. Answer six demographic questions such as age, years in IS Security, etc.  
3. Provide a free-form response to a single question: What questions would you ask information systems 
security professionals (job candidates, colleagues, etc.) to determine whether they will be/are effective 
information security worker? (Not necessarily tool-/environment-specific questions) 
4. A follow-up e-mail will be sent with a URL requesting you to rank the order of importance of the questions 
provided by everyone responding.  
5. Finally, an e-mail with a URL to a request you to confirm or modify the ranking will be sent. 
 
I anticipate you will only need to provide 5 minutes of your time for each of the three rounds.  
 
Below is the URL to copy and paste into your browser.  Unfortunately, on previous e-mails, my mail server has 
converted the URL to a link.  That was not my intention, because I don’t click on links, either. 
 
http://uofmississippi.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_6zfUKV3Xfh37pQh&email=[e-mail address removed] 
Respectfully, 
 
David Pumphrey 
Doctoral Candidate 
University of Mississippi 
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Thank you for providing an excellent list of questions and tasks to help assess information security knowledge 
and abilities.   
 
The next step is to rank the questions below, identifying, at least, the top 10 questions/tasks from the list 
provided by you and by your peers.  I would very much appreciate it if you could reply by close of business on 
Thursday, October 17, 2013, if at all possible. 
 
You may notice that I may have reworded some of your shorter suggested questions. I did this for consistency 
or clarity.  If I changed your intent too drastically, please e-mail me with my error, please. 
 
Please hit Reply on this note and then follow the directions below. 
 
To rank them, please do so in one of the following two ways, after hitting Reply (no link to Qualtrics for this 
round): 
 
1.  Provide the letters in ranked order in the table below: 
 
First: 
Second: 
Third: 
Fourth: 
Fifth: 
Sixth: 
Seventh: 
Eighth: 
Ninth: 
Tenth: 
Add more, if desired. 
- OR -  
2.  Type the ranking (1 through at least 10) in the blank to the left of the question/task. 
_______  A. Do you understand security scoring such as the Common Vulnerability Scoring System 
(CVSS)? 
_______  B.  What Common Vulnerability & Exposure (CVE) alerts have you noticed recently that you 
would take action on right away? 
_______  C. Describe what you would consider to be a mature security posture? 
_______  D. Just how paranoid are you about the security threats facing my network? 
_______  E. How will you add value to our Information Security team? 
_______  F. What training and experience do you have in Information Security? 
_______  G. What certifications do you hold? 
_______  H. Why did you get into Information Security? 
_______  I. What do you see as the biggest issue for information Security Professionals today? 
_______  J. Describe your top accomplishments in Information Security 
_______  K. What is the most secure endpoint computer (server or workstation) that can be had? 
_______  L. Given a defined budget, what would be some things they would do to improve the 
company's Infosec posture? 
_______  M. Describe what is meant by an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) 
_______  N. Which country do you believe presents the most risks or threats to our country 
_______  O. What is the biggest challenge you have faced in securing your past or current employer 
and how did you manage that challenge? 
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_______  P. Describe the technologies in which your consider yourself an expert 
_______  Q. In what technologies do you have a working understanding? 
_______  R. Rate your written skills on a scale of 1 to 10 with 10 being highest/best? 
_______  S. Rate your verbal skills on a scale of 1 to 10 with 10 being highest/best? 
_______  T. Describe your work experiences dealing with various technologies and your degree of 
involvement in those projects.
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